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I. Introduction
The Supreme Court has imposed the plain-meaning standard of statutory interpretation on the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court has
indicated that the plain language of the Rules now controls outcomes
without regard to policy, history, practical operation of the law of evidence, or new conditions. The plain-meaning standard has the potential
to create a new evidence law.
The Supreme Court, of course, did not invent the plain-meaning
standard specifically for the Federal Rules of Evidence. More than fifty
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B. 1967, Princeton University; J.D. 1970,
University of Chicago Law School; LL.M. 1971, New York University Law School. The author
wishes to thank Arthur Best, Joyce Saltalamachia, and Donald Zeigler for their suggestions and
assistance.
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years before these Rules existed, for example, the Court, interpreting a
criminal statute, stated:
If the words are plain, they give meaning to the act, and it is
neither the duty nor the privilege of the courts to enter speculative
fields in search of a different meaning.
... [W]hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as
the final expression of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations drawn from titles or
designating names or reports accompanying their introduction, or
from any extraneous source. In other words, the language being
plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.1
Although the earliest formulations of the plain-meaning standard of
statutory construction rigidly forbade all use of extrinsic interpretive aids
when the meaning of a statute's words was plain, 2 this position has softened slightly. 3 Today, the standard requires courts to enforce a statute's
literal language unless the legislative history of a provision explicitly indicates that the legislators intended another meaning. 4 Outside this nar1. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917). Contra United States v. Monia, 317
U.S. 424, 431 (1943) ("The notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also
plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification.").
2. See Jones, The Plain MeaningRule andExtrinsicAids in the Interpretationof FederalStatutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 5 (1939) ("The main effect of the rule in modem statutory interpretation
... is that it bars resort to otherwise admissible extrinsic aids, evidencing the meaning or purpose of
the enacting legislators, in cases which, in the judgment of the deciding court, fall within the scope of
its operation.").
3. "The plain meaning rule has many formulations, but its essential aspect is a denial of the
need to 'interpret' unambiguous language.... In the federal courts the most common effect of the
rule has been to preclude resort to bits of legislative history such as reports, hearings, and debates."
Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the
"Modern" FederalCourts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1299-300 (1975) (footnote omitted); cf Kelso
& Kelso, Appeals in Federal Courtsby ProsecutingEntities Other Than the United States: The Plain
MeaningRule Revisited, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 187, 208 (1981) ("[M]odem debate over the rule centers
on the permissible use of extrinsic materials to determine legislative intent.").
4. "[S]tatutory construction 'must begin with the language of the statute itself,'" Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982) (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187 (1980)), and "'[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'" Id. (quoting Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); see also Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretationin the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.
892, 902 (1982) (concluding that "absent explicit authorization, the Court will not depart from statutory words"); cf. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 195-96 (1983) (arguing that the plain meaning of statutory
language outweighs its legislative history). Judge Patricia M. Wald notes:
When the plain meaning rhetoric is invoked, it becomes a device not for ignoring legislative
history but for shifting onto legislative history the burden of proving that the words do not
mean what they appear to say ....
While the plain meaning rule does not preclude a
detailed examination of legislative history, its invocation almost invariably signals that the
legislative history will not meet the burden of rebutting the reading of the text that is
"readily apparent" to the author of the opinion.
Id. (footnote omitted). For an example of a case in which the Court followed legislative history
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row circumstance, the words' plain meaning controls.
The plain-meaning standard has been criticized. Some commentators contend that the search for plain meaning is illusory because words
standing by themselves do not have a single meaning.
Words do mean different things in different contexts. Holmes said:
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." To
stop at the purely literal meaning of a word, phrase, or sentenceif indeed the purely literal meaning can be found-ignores reality. 5
The courts have also drawn criticism for their selective application
of the plain-meaning standard. What Professor Harry Wilmer Jones said
fifty years ago could be repeated today: "the doctrine is not followed
invariably by the courts, and ... the incidence of its application has been
'6
uncertain and unpredictable."
Despite the force of these critical comments, the modem Supreme
Court has applied the plain-meaning standard even when it has produced
harsh results that the drafters and adopters of a particular statute did not
intend. For example, in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors,Inc.,7 the Court
followed the literal language of a federal statute in deciding that the trial
8
court did not have discretion in calculating a wage penalty:
[T]he unadorned language of the statute dictates that the master or
owner "shallpay to the seaman" the sums specified "for each and
because that history indicated a result contrary to the words of the statute, see Train v. Colorado
Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1976).
5. Wald, supra note 4, at 199 (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (footnote
omitted)); see Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333,
341 (1976). Professor John M. Kernochan comments:
[T]he literal rule runs counter to the findings of student of the symbolic aspects of language. Pitched as it is in terms of the plain meaning of statutory words, it assumes that
words may have a single necessary meaning independent of their full context, without regard to how those words were used. This is dangerous and unwise. At root, the literal
approach puts the wrong question. The question in human interchanges is not what the
words mean but what the user of the words meant by them.
Id. (footnote omitted). For an example of Supreme Court Justices splitting as to whether words had
a plain meaning, see FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 625 n.7 (1982).
6. Jones, supra note 2, at 11. Jones concluded that "[i]n short, the plain meaning rule is
applied or ignored, apparently at the discretion of the interpreting judges, and it is impossible to
frame any generalization concerning the conditions of its applicability which will fit all of the cases."
Id. at 17. Professor Arthur W. Murphy also observed that the cases give the impression that
the courts have no clear idea about what the plain meaning rule is and, what is more, that
they really do not care. Indeed, it frequently seems that some courts feel that recitation of
the plain meaning rule in one of its forms is a compulsory rite, the meaning of which is lost
in antiquity, and which, since it is essentially meaningless, can be supported by meaningless
citation.
Murphy, supra note 3, at 1308; cf Kernochan, supra note 5, at 343 (noting that "[t]he argument is
sometimes made for the literal rule that its application is necessary to assure certainty in the law").
7. 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
8. See 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1982).
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every day during which payment is delayed." The words chosen by
Congress, given their plain meaning, leave no room for the exercise
of discretion in either deciding whether to exact payment or in
choosing the period of days by which the payment is to be
calculated. 9
The Court's application of the literal meaning of the statute's words
meant that an employer's refusal to pay 412 dollars in wages led to a
recovery of over 300,000 dollars. Although the Justices characterized
this result as absurd and not foreseen by Congress, 10 the majority concluded that "[ilt is enough that Congress intended that the language it
enacted would be applied as we have applied it. The remedy for any
dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress and
not with this Court. Congress may amend the statute; we may not.""
The plain-meaning standard also led to harsh and unforeseen results
in United States v. Locke.1 2 In that case, a family-held mining claim
worth millions of dollars, which had been legally held and actively maintained for a score of years, was escheated to the Government. 13 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,14 requires a mining
claim holder to file a yearly notice with the Bureau of Land Management
"prior to December 31.L'I Locke filed his 1980 notice on December 31.
Although Locke contended without contradiction that Bureau personnel
had stated that the notice could be presented on December 31, the Court
held that his filing violated the plain language of the statute, which indicated December 30 as the last permissible date. 16 The Court thus allowed the Government to take Locke's mining claim. Although this
result was unfair, the Court concluded it was required by the statute's
words:
9. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 570.
10. The dissent concluded that "since the result [that the plain-meaning] construction produces
in this case is both absurd and palpably unjust, this is one of the cases in which the exercise of
judgment dictates a departure from the literal text in order to be faithful to the legislative will." Id.
at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority conceded that "[i]t
is probably true that Congress did
not precisely envision the grossness of the difference in this case between the actual wages withheld
and the amount of the award required by the statute." Id. at 576.
11. Id. Griffin rejected the argument that allowing the trial court discretion in setting the penalty would best serve the legislative purposes of the statute, noting that the contracting company "is
unable to support this view of legislative purpose by reference to the terms of the statute." Id. at
571. Although the opinion conceded that "in rare cases the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters, and those intentions must be
controlling," id., no better evidence of the legislative purpose exists than the words used to make up
the statute. Only the truly "exceptional case" could cause a departure from the plain language. Id.
12. 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985).
13. Id. at 89-91.
14. Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (current version codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982)).
15. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) (1982).
16. Locke, 471 U.S. at 96.
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the fact that Congress might have acted with greater clarity or
foresight does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft statutes in
an effort to achieve that which Congress is perceived to have failed
to do .... Nor is the Judiciary licensed to attempt to soften the
clear import of Congress' chosen words whenever a court believes
those words lead to a harsh result.... The phrase "prior to" may
be clumsy, but its meaning is clear. Under these circumstances, we
are obligated to apply the "prior to December 31" language by its
17
terms.
The Supreme Court is now also applying the plain-meaning standard to the Federal Rules of Evidence. The plain-meaning standard applied to the Rules will decide evidentiary controversies, reverse settled
points of law, and produce some uncontemplated outcomes. The
changes brought about by application of the plain-meaning standard will,
of course, be the law until Congress acts. The plain-meaning standard
will take away much of evidence law's dynamic quality, forcing courts to
decide cases without considering evidentiary policy. None of the potential changes are too startling by themselves. But together the changed
practices will significantly transform the evidentiary landscape into a topography unforeseen and unintended by those who drafted and adopted
the Rules.
Part II of this Article traces the Supreme Court's application of the
plain-meaning standard to particular provisions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Article then shows that the Court's logic indicates that
the standard should be applied to the Rules in their entirety. In Part III,
the Article presents illustrations of how the plain-meaning standard will
affect specific, diverse portions of the Rules. Finally, the Article concludes with a discussion of the plain-meaning standard's general effect on
federal evidence law.
II.

The Supreme Court's Application of the Plain-Meaning Standard
to the Federal Rules of Evidence

A.

Bourjaily v. United States

The Supreme Court first applied the plain-meaning standard to the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Bourjaily v. United States. 18 In that case, a
drug seller's out-of-court statements implicated the defendant. 19 The
Government claimed that these statements were admissible under Rule
801(d)(2)(E), which allows the admission of hearsay when the maker of
17. Id. at 95-96 (citation and footnote omitted).
18. 483 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1987).
19. Id. at 174.
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the statement and the defendant are part of the same conspiracy and the
statements are made in furtherance and during the course of the conspiracy.20 The evidence could be admitted under this theory only if the prosecution first proved two facts: that a conspiracy existed and that the
defendant was part of that conspiracy. 21 The question presented in
Bourjaily was whether the disputed evidence itself, which was not admissible until the preliminary facts were established, could be used to help
prove those preliminary facts. 22 The Supreme Court held that the disputed evidence could be used to help prove the preliminary facts because
23
the plain language of the Rules mandated that result.
The Court's conclusion-that presumptively inadmissible hearsay
can be used to help make itself admissible-abolished a longstanding
prohibition against such bootstrapping. Almost a half-century earlier, in
Glasser v. United States,24 the Supreme Court stated that coconspirator
"declarations are admissible over the objection of an alleged co-conspirator, who was not present when they were made, only if there is proof
aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy. Otherwise, hearsay
would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent
25
evidence."
This prohibition against bootstrapping was so firmly ensconced that
more than thirty years later, in United States v. Nixon, 26 the Supreme
Court, without discussion, repeated it: "Declarations by one defendant
may also be admissible against other defendants upon a sufficient showing, by independent evidence, of a conspiracy among one or more other
defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at issue were in fur27
therance of that conspiracy."
Rule 104(a), however, states that "[p]reliminary questions concern20. "A statement is not hearsay if... the statement is offered against a party and is... a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E).
21. The Court held that a preponderance of evidence was the proper burden to apply in determining whether the foundation facts had been established. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 176. The dissent
agreed. See id. at 186 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22. The Court did not decide whether the preliminary facts could be established solely by the
hearsay statements.
We need not decide in this case whether the courts below could have relied solely upon [the
coconspirator's] hearsay statements to determine that a conspiracy had been established by
a preponderance of the evidence ....
It is sufficient for today to hold that a court, in
making a preliminary factual determination under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), may examine the
hearsay statements sought to be admitted.
Id. at 181.
23. Id. at 178-79 & n.2.
24. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
25. Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted).
26. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
27. Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
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ing... admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court .... In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges. ' ' 28 The plain language of this Rule,
which Congress adopted after the Glasser and Nixon decisions, specifically sanctions using inadmissible evidence in deciding preliminary factual questions that control admissibility of evidence. Taken on its face,
Rule 104(a) permits the trial court to weigh the presumptively inadmissible hearsay in determining whether a conspiracy existed and whether the
defendant was part of it; it permits the bootstrapping that Glasser and
Nixon banned.
At the time of Bouraily, however, the majority of the circuit courts
continued to follow Glasser and Nixon.2 9 The framers of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, these courts reasoned, were well aware of the longsettled practice against such bootstrapping. When the drafters wished to
change the traditional approach to an evidence rule, they said so. Because the drafters did not articulate an intent to change Glasser, their
silence indicates that the bootstrapping ban was meant to and did survive
30
the adoption of the Federal Rules.
The Bouraily majority, however, flatly rejected this reasoning. The
Court instead concluded:
It would be extraordinary to require legislative history to confirm
the plain meaning of Rule 104. The Rule on its face allows the
trial judge to consider any evidence whatsoever, bound only by the
rules of privilege. We think that the Rule is sufficiently clear that
to the extent that
it is inconsistent with... Glasserand Nixon, the
31
Rule prevails.
28. FED. R. EVID. 104(a); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987) ("The
Rule on its face allows the trial judge to consider any evidence whatsoever, bound only by the rules
of privilege.").
29. "The Courts of Appeals have widely... held that in determining the preliminary facts
relevant to co-conspirators' out-of-court statements, a court may not look at the hearsay statements
themselves for their evidentiary value." Boudaily, 483 U.S. at 181. The dissent's survey concluded
that only the First and the Sixth Circuit allowed the hearsay statements to be weighed in determining the preliminary facts while the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
did not. The D.C. and Seventh Circuits had not passed on the issue. See id. at 196 n.9 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
30. See, eg., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 261 (3d Cir. 1983)
(concluding that neither Rule 801(d)(2)(E) nor Rule 104(a) "was intended to change the settled law
that there must be independent proof aliunde of the existence of and membership in a conspiracy
before coconspirator statements are admissible against a party"), rev'd on other grounds sub noma.
Matsushita Elecs. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) ; United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d
1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978) (rejecting the suggestion "that the new Federal Rules of Evidence have
altered the requirement that the admissibility of a coconspirator's statement be determined on evidence exclusive of the statement itself" and concluding, "[w]e believe that the requirement of independent evidence is an important safeguard, however, and therefore adhere to our traditional
rule.").
31. Bouraily, 483 U.S. at 178-79. Then-Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the Court's opinion in
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Although the Court could have interpreted the legislative history in
a manner that preserved the prohibition against bootstrapping that had
been in effect before the Rules were adopted, 32 the Court instead simply
chose to follow the literal words of Rule 104(a). In Bourjaily, then, the
plain language of the Rule prevailed even though the contrary practice
had been long and widely accepted and even though nothing in the legislative history showed any intention to change that practice. Plain meaning won out over both evidentiary history and legislative silence.

B.

Huddleston v. United States

The Supreme Court again applied the plain-meaning standard to the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Huddleston v. United States.33 The question presented was whether the trial court properly admitted testimony
as evidence of a similar act or prior crime under Rule 404(b), 34 which
forbids the introduction of such evidence for the purpose of establishing
the defendant's character, but does not prohibit it when introduced for
Bourally, took the opposite view of legislative silence when he wrote the majority opinion in Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981). McNary involved a suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for damages for the allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax. The Tax
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), expressly bars federal courts from enjoining the collection
of state taxes, but it does not prohibit a federal damages claim. Relnquist noted that comity principles would relegate the plaintiffs to state court, but also noted "that comity does not apply where
§ 1983 is involved." McNary, 454 U.S. at 105. Even though the plain language of § 1983 allowed
the money claim and even though the plain language of the Tax Injunction Act and its legislative
history show no intent to bar such claims, Rehnquist relied on the absence of an express legislative
statement to reverse the previous practice prohibiting the federal action: "Neither the legislative
history of the Act nor that of its precursor... suggests that Congress intended that federal-court
deference in state tax matters be limited to the actions enumerated in those sections. Thus, the
principle of comity which predated the Act was not restricted by its pAssage." Id. at 110 (citations
omitted); see also Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1976)
(refusing to enforce the literal language of a statute because those words would have required a
"significant alteration" of past practices and the legislative history did not clearly indicate that the
change was intended).
32. The dissenters in Bourlaily concluded that the legislative history affirmatively indicated the
preservation of the antibootstrapping rule. After tracing the difficulties of finding a good rationale
for the admission of coconspirator statements, they noted that the advisory committee adopted the
common law's agency rationale.
The Advisory Committee, however, expressed its doubts about the agency rationale and,
on the basis of these doubts, plainly stated that the exemption should not be changed or
extended: "the agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a
basis for admissibility beyond that already established." In light of this intention not to
alter the common-law exemption, the Advisory Committee's Notes thus make very clear
that Rule 801(d)(2)(E) was to include all the components of this exemption, including the
independent-evidence requirement.
Bouilaily, 481 U.S. at 193-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID.
801 advisory committee's note); see also id. at 194 n.8 (asserting that "[i]n particular, the [legislative]
history indicates that the independent evidence requirement was understood to be retained in the
Rule").
33. 485 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1988).
34. See id. at 682.
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some other purpose. 35
Huddleston was charged with selling and possessing stolen video
cassette tapes. He contended that he did not know that the goods were
stolen. The prosecution introduced evidence that he had previously sold
televisions at very low prices. 36 Huddleston conceded that this disputed
evidence was relevant as to whether he knew the tapes were stolen and,
thus, admissible to show his state of mind. 37 Yet, the evidence was probative of Huddleston's state of mind only if the televisions had been stolen.3 8 Huddleston contended that, because evidence of a prior crimetheft of televisions-might lead to undue prejudice and an unfair conviction, the prosecution should have to convince the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that the sets had been stolen before testimony
39
about them could be admitted.
Huddleston's position had solid support. Many courts had imposed
special standards for the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) because evidence of other crimes presents unique dangers to a fair verdict. 40
Such evidence is so powerful that jurors are likely to misuse the evidence.
Unless one is willing to make the almost certainly mistaken assumption that the jury can follow instructions and consider other
35. Rule 404(b) provides:
... Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).

36. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 683.
37. See id. at 686.
38.
The Government's theory of relevance was that the televisions were stolen, and proof that
petitioner had engaged in a series of sales of stolen merchandise from the same suspicious
source would be strong evidence that he was aware that each of these items, including the
Memorex tapes, was stolen. As such, the sale of the television was a "similar act" only if
the televisions were stolen.
Id. (footnote omitted).
39. Huddleston's brief argued that the similar act had to be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. At oral argument, Huddleston's counsel conceded that such a position was untenable in
light of Bouraily. See id. at 687 n.5.
40. Huddleston's own survey of the circuits concluded:
The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits allow the admission of similar act
evidence if the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to find that the defendant committed
the act. Consistent with the Sixth Circuit, the Second Circuit prohibits the introduction of
similar act evidence unless the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the act. The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits require the Government to prove to the court by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant committed the similar act.
Id. at 685 n.2 (citations omitted); cf C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 508 (1988) ("Most other acts proved pursuant to FRE
404(b) are themselves crimes, and most courts require the government to prove these extrinsic offenses by 'clear and convincing evidence.' ").
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crimes evidence only for the limited purpose on which it is admitted, the dangers which the propensity rule is designed to guard
against exist
when other crimes evidence is admitted for any
41
purpose.

Thus, if jurors are likely to misuse evidence of other crimes, extraordinary care must be taken to ensure fair and accurate determinations. 42
A unanimous Supreme Court, however, once again applied the
plain-meaning standard and rejected the argument that special criteria
should be applied for the admission of evidence of other crimes. The
Court concluded that Huddleston's position was "inconsistent with the
structure of the Rules of Evidence and with the plain language of Rule
404(b) ....

The text [of 404(b)] contains no intimation .. .that any

preliminary showing is necessary before such [extrinsic act] evidence may
be introduced for a proper purpose. ' 43 Instead, the Court continued,
evidence of other crimes should be treated like any other question of conditional relevancy. 44 The evidence about the televisions only tended to
establish Huddleston's guilt if the jurors first found that the televisions
were in fact stolen. When the relevance of one piece of evidence is conditioned or dependent on the finding of another fact, the Court concluded,
the trial court, in determining whether the evidence should be admitted,
does not determine whether the foundation fact exists. 45 Instead, the

41.

R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS,

TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 220 (2d ed. 1982) (footnote omitted). Courts and other commentators
have reached similar conclusions. See, eg., United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 1965)
(noting that "there can be no complete assurance that the jury even under the best of instructions
will strictly confine the use of [evidence of other crimes] to the issue of knowledge and intent and
wholly put out of their minds the implication that the accused, having committed the prior similar
criminal act, probably committed the one with which he is actually charged"); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OP EVIDENCE § 5.15, at 162 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing "the great potential for prejudicial consequences inherent in other crimes evidence"). Because of the important
consequences of admitting this sort of evidence, no "part of the law of evidence is more litigated than
that having to do with the admissibility of evidence of other crimes." J. WEINSTEIN, J. MANSFIELD,
N. ABRAMS & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 959 (8th ed. 1988) [hereinafter J.
WEINSTEIN].

42. See FED. R. EVID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law
of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.").
43. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687-88. This time the Court also went on to indicate that the
legislative history of Rule 404(b) supported the plain language of the Rule. See id. at 688-89.
44. See id. at 688. Questions of conditional relevancy arise whenever jurors can treat evidence
as relevant only if they first find some other fact to exist: "In the Rule 404(b) context, similar act
evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the
defendant was the actor.... Such questions of relevance conditioned on a fact are dealt with under
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b)." Id. at 689. Rule 104(b) provides: "When the relevancy of
evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject
to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."
FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
45. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690.
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court merely decides whether the jury could find that it exists.4 6 If the
jury in its deliberation then finds that the preliminary fact was established, it will treat the evidence as relevant and weigh it. If the jury finds
that the preliminary fact was not proved, it will disregard the evidence.
The Court reached its result in Huddleston by mechanical application of the Rule's literal language. The Court did not acknowledge the
impossible task it was assigning to juries, 47 or even consider that a contrary result may have better served federal evidence policy. The Court
did not examine which approach was most likely to achieve accurate fact
determinations. 48 Just as plain meaning won out in Bouraily over evidentiary history and legislative silence, the plain-meaning standard triumphed in Huddleston over the overarching policy concerns of the Rules
themselves. 49
C.

United States v. Owens

The Supreme Court again applied the plain-meaning standard in
UnitedStates v. Owens.50 Owens was tried for a brutal attack on a prison
guard. 5 1 The guard suffered severe memory loss, and at trial he could
not identify his assailant or remember the assault. 52 He did remember
46. See id.
47. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
48. The Huddleston Court did, however, note:
We share petitioner's concern that unduly prejudicial evidence might be introduced
under Rule 404(b). We think, however, that the protection against such unfair prejudice
emanates not from a requirement of a preliminary finding by the trial court, but rather
from four other sources: first, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be
offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402-as
enforced through Rule 104(b); third, from the assessment the trial court must make under
Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and fourth, from Federal Rule of
Evidence 105, which provides that the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that
the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was
admitted.
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92 (citations and footnote omitted).
49. At times, the Supreme Court has taken the opposite approach; it has ignored a statute's
literal words in favor of overarching policy concerns. For a prime example, see Lehman v. Lycoming, 458 U.S. 502 (1982). In that case, the Court addressed whether a natural mother could maintain a habeas corpus challenge to a state's placement of her children in foster care. See id. at 505-09.
Although it conceded that both the words and past interpretations of the federal habeas statute
supported the argument that foster care was "custody" within the statute's meaning, the Court held
that the mother could not invoke federal jurisdiction, stating:
The federal writ of habeas corpus, representing as it does a profound interference with state
judicial systems and the finality of state decisions, should be reserved for those instances in
which the federal interest in individual liberty is so strong that it outweighs federalism and
finality concerns. Congress has indicated no intention that § 2254 encompass a claim like
that of petitioner.
Id. at 515-16 (footnote omitted).
50. 484 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1988).
51. Id. at 556.
52. Id.
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and the trial court allowed him to testify, however, that he had previously identified the defendant as his attacker.5 3 The subsequent crossexamination revealed only that the guard did not recall the crime and
54
remembered almost no details about his identification of Owens.
The trial court admitted the guard's testimony under Rule
801(d)(1)(C), 55 which exempts from the hearsay-ban evidence of out-ofcourt identifications when the identifier is subject at trial to cross-examination concerning the statement.5 6 Owens contended that because the
guard had no memory of the assault, Owens could not cross-examine
him within the meaning of 801(d)(1)(C). 5 7 The Ninth Circuit, relying on
the policy underlying the Rule, agreed and held that prior identification
evidence may be admitted only when the declarant can be cross-ex58
amined about the basis of the identification.
The cross-examination requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) is intended to permit the opposing party to explore the trustworthiness
of the extra-judicial statement of identification ....
In order to
explore adequately the trustworthiness of the prior identification,
and thereby satisfy the purpose of the Rule, the opposing party
must be permitted to cross-examine the declarant on the facts and
circumstances underlying the identification....
...We conclude that [the guard's] inability to answer questions on cross-examination prevented appellant from adequately
exploring the basis for [the guard's] out-of-court identifications
and that the jury did not have sufficient
grounds for evaluating the
59
correctness of those identifications.
Because the guard's memory loss prevented meaningful cross-exam53. Id.
54. The appeals court gave the following description of the guard's cross-examination:
On cross-examination, Foster [the guard] reaffirmed his inability to recount the details
of the attack. When asked if he remembered making any statements during his hospitalization, Foster testified that the only statements he remembered making were the statements
of identification made to Mansfield [an investigator]. Defense counsel sought to refresh
Foster's recollection with certain hospital records indicating that while he was hospitalized
Foster had alternately disclaimed knowledge of his attacker and attributed the assault to
someone other than Owens. However, Foster was still unable to remember making any
statements other than the ones to Mansfield. Similarly, Foster was unable to remember
any visitors other than Mansfield, nor could he remember whether any of these visitors had
suggested that Owens had been his assailant. Finally, Foster reaffirmed that he could
"vivid[ly]" recall his statement to Mansfield and that at the time he made the statement, he
knew why he had identified Owens. However, he was unable to remember any fact or
reason that had caused him to state that Owens was the assailant.
United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
55. See Owens, 484 U.S. at 557 n.1.
56. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) (providing that a statement of identification of a person is
not hearsay if made after perception, at trial or a hearing, and when subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement).
57. Owens, 484 U.S. at 561.
58. Owens, 789 F.2d at 756.
59. Id. at 756-57.
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ination, the guard's testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Without even
discussing the purpose of the cross-examination requirement, the
Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis. 60 As long as the
evidence meets the plain, facial requirements of the Rule, according to
the Court, it is admissible. 61 Prior identification evidence is admissible as
long as the declarant testifies under oath and answers questions at trial,
even if the declarant cannot meaningfully testify about the crime or the
identification.
[T]he more natural reading of "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" includes what was available here. Ordinarily a witness is regarded as "subject to cross-examination" when
he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to
questions ....
[L]imitations on the scope of examination by the
trial court or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine
the process to such a degree that meaningful cross-examination
within the intent of the rule no longer exists. But that effect is not
produced by the witness's assertion of memory loss ....
Rule
801(d)(1)(C), which specifies that the cross-examination need 62
only
"concer[n] the statement," does not on its face require more.
Plain language again controls. The Rule on its face just requires
that the declarant be "subject to cross-examination" about his prior
statement. The words do not demand the ability to examine the declarant about the basis for his identification. Because the witness took the
oath and answered all questions about the identification to the best of his
ability, the defendant was not deprived of his right to cross-examine the
declarant. The fact that the cross-examination was virtually meaningless
did not matter to the Court because the cross-examination satisfied the
plain language of the Rule. The Court made no effort to determine the
purpose of the Rule's cross-examination restriction. The plain meaning
of the words was more significant in deciding the content of an eviden60. The Court did say:
Congress plainly was aware of the recurrent evidentiary problem at issue here-witness
forgetfulness of an underlying event-but chose not to make it an exception to Rule
801(d)(1)(C).
... The premise for [the] Rule... was that, given adequate safeguards against suggestiveness, out-of-court identifications were generally preferable to courtroom identifications
... [and] their use was to be fostered rather than discouraged.... To judge from the House
and Senate Reports, Rule 801(d)(I)(C) was in part directed to the very problem here at
issue: a memory loss that makes it impossible for the witness to provide an in-court identification or testify about details of the events underlying an earlier identification.
Owens, 484 U.S. at 562-63. The Court did not explain or discuss why, then, the Rules contain any
cross-examination requirement. If the Court's observations are correct, the Rules should have made
evidence of prior identifications an unqualified exception to the hearsay rule.
61. See id. at 562.
62. Id. at 561-62.
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tiary provision than the specific policies that caused the drafters to use
those words.
D. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.
The one recent Supreme Court case that does not rigidly follow the
literal language of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Green v. Bock Laundry Machine C0. 6 3 Bock, the defendant in a products liability suit, impeached the plaintiff's testimony by eliciting the fact that plaintiff had
been convicted of felonies. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the
trial court should have excluded the impeaching evidence. 4 This contention required an interpretation of Rule 609(a)(1), which states that
evidence of a felony conviction "shall be admitted" to impeach the testimony of a witness if "the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant." 65 Applying the plain meaning of this Rule in civil cases would
mean that evidence of convictions could always be used to impeach a
plaintiff. The Rule only allows the evidence to be excluded when the
court determines that the prejudice from the evidence to the defendant
outweighs its probative value and impeaching the plaintiff will not prejudice the defendant.6 6 On the other hand, the Rule's plain meaning would
permit such impeaching evidence of a civil defendant to be excluded because the prejudicial effect to the defendant of this impeachment might
not be outweighed by its probative value. The Court noted that this
strange imbalance between the rights of civil plaintiffs and defendants
67
could have no sensible purpose and was probably unconstitutional.
63. 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1984 (1989).
64. See id. at 1983.
65.
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness had been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1)was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant ....
FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
66. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted:
The Rule's plain language commands weighing of prejudice to a defendant in a civil
trial as well as in a criminal trial. But that literal reading would compel an odd result in a
case like this. Assuming that all impeaching evidence has at least minimal probative value,
and given that the evidence of plaintiff's convictions had some prejudicial effect on his
case-but surely none on defendant Bock's-balancing according to the strict language of
Rule 609(a)(1) inevitably leads to the conclusion that the evidence was admissible. In fact,
under this construction of the Rule, impeachment detrimental to a civil plaintiff always
would have to be admitted.
Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1984-85.
67. See id.
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Consequently, the Court held that the Rule could not mean what its literal words stated:
No matter how plain the text of the Rule may be, we cannot
accept an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same
right to impeach an adversary's testimony that it grants to a civil
defendant. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees
a criminal defendant certain fair trial rights not enjoyed by the
prosecution, while the Fifth Amendment lets the accused choose
not to testify at trial. In contrast, civil litigants in federal court
share equally the protections of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.... [C]ivil litigants almost always must testify in depositions or at trial. ...Evidence that a litigant or his witness is a
convicted felon tends to shift a jury's focus from the worthiness of
the litigant's position to the moral worth of the litigant himself. It
is unfathomable why a civil plaintiff-but not a civil defendantshould be subjected to this risk. Thus we agree with the Seventh
Circuit that as far as civil
trials are concerned, Rule 609(a)(1)
"can't mean what it says."'6 8
While Green is a rejection of the plain-meaning standard in this particular instance, the Court gave no indication that it was doing anything
more than temporarily abandoning the standard. Instead, all the Justices
indicated that the unique circumstances of this specific Rule required
plain meaning to be momentarily set aside to avoid an irrational result
69
that probably would have been unconstitutional.
68. Id. at 1985 (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987)) (footnote omitted). On January 26, 1990, the Supreme Court promulgated an amended Rule 609 (a). If Congress
does not act, the amended Rule will take effect on December 1, 1990. The new Rule's language
comports with the Court's interpretation in Green, providing:
General rule.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that
an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
58 U.S.L.W. 3490 (Feb. 6, 1990).
69. Justice Scalia concurring in the judgment stated:
We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result....
The word "defendant" in Rule 609(a)(1) cannot rationally (or perhaps even constitutionally) mean to provide the benefit of prejudice-weighing to civil defendants and not civil
plaintiffs. Since petitioner has not produced and we have not ourselves discovered even a
snippet of support for this absurd result, we may confidently assume that the word was not
used (as it normally would be) to refer to all defendants and only all defendants.
Id. at 1994 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun in dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, also concluded that the provision could not mean what it said on its face. See id. at 1995
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The majority, after concluding that plain meaning did not control, extensively examined the
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E. United States v. Zolin
United States v. Zolin 70 indicates that the abandonment of the plainmeaning standard was, indeed, temporary as the Court, only one month
after Green, again relied on that standard in its interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.7 1 The Internal Revenue Service sought tapes,
claimed to be protected by the attorney-client privilege, but which the
72
IRS contended fell within the crime-fraud exception to that privilege.
The lower courts found the tapes to be privileged without listening to
73
them in camera as the IRS had contended should have been done.
The Supreme Court noted that Rules 104(a) and 1101(c), which indicate that privileges apply to all stages of proceedings and that privileges
must be honored in determining whether a privilege exists, might seem to
forbid a court from reviewing communications between an attorney and
client when deciding whether that communication is privileged. 74 The
Court noted, however, that this interpretation would lead to the absurd
situation in which the crime-fraud exception could almost never be established. 75 The unanimous Court7 6 then went on to reject that restrictive
provision's legislative history and concluded that Rule 609(a)(1) requires a trial judge to admit impeachment by prior felony convictions of all civil witnesses regardless of the prejudice resulting to
the party offering the testimony. For a criticism of this result, especially as it will affect prisoner
civil rights suits, see The Supreme Court, 1988-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 300-10
(1989). Significantly, the Supreme Court's recent amendment to Rule 609(a) requires a Rule 403
balancing analysis before witnesses, other than criminal defendants, may be impeached by evidence
of prior convictions. See 58 U.S.L.W. 3490 (Feb. 6, 1990). For the text of amended Rule 609, see
supra note 61.
70. 109 S.Ct. 2619 (1989).
71. See id. at 2628.
72. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not create any privileges. Instead, Rule 501 states that
when federal rights are adjudicated in federal courts privileges "shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501. The Court has accepted a privilege for confidential
attorney-client communications, but not for advice which counsels future wrongdoing-the "crimefraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege. See Zolin, 109 S. Ct. at 2625-26.
73. See id. at 2623.
74.
At first blush, two provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence would appear to be relevant. Rule 104(a) provides: "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court.... In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of
evidence except those with respect to privileges ....
Rule 1101(c) provides: "The rule with
respect to privileges applies at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings." Taken
together, these Rules might be read to establish that in a summons-enforcement proceeding, attorney-client communications cannot be considered by the district court in making
its crime-fraud ruling: to do otherwise, under this view, would be to make the crime-fraud
determination without due regard to the existence of the privilege.
Zolin, 109 S. Ct. at 2627-28.
75. The Court noted:
Even those scholars who support this reading of Rule 104(a) acknowledge that it leads
to an absurd result ....
• . . "There is virtually no way in which [the crime-fraud] exception can ever be
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reading, concluding that it is not consistent with the provision's clear
meaning:
We find this Draconian interpretation of Rule 104(a) inconsistent with the Rule's plain language. The Rule does not provide by
its terms that all materials as to which a "clai[m] of privilege" is
made must be excluded from consideration. In that critical respect, the language of Rule 104(a) is markedly different from the
comparable California evidence rule, which provides that "the presiding officer may not require disclosure of information claimed to
be privileged under this division in order to rule on the claim of
privilege." There is no reason to read Rule77 104(a) as if its text
were identical to that of the California rule.
Together, Bourjaily, Huddleston, Owens, Green, and Zolin indicate
that when a Rule has clear language, 78 the plain-meaning standard will
now control outcomes under the Federal Rules of Evidence unless the
literal language would produce an unfathomable result that is probably
unconstitutional. The Court has applied the plain-meaning standard to
diverse Rules, even though it produced results that conflict with those
mandated by evidentiary history and widely accepted by lower courts.
The plain-meaning standard controls without any determination of the
purpose for a Rule's specific restriction. All nine Supreme Court Justices
proved, save by compelling disclosure of the contents of the communication; Rule 104(a)
provides that this cannot be done."
Id. at 2628 (quoting 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5055, at 276 (1977)).
76. Justice Brennan did not participate. Id. at 2620.
77. Id. at 2628 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 915(a) (West 1966 & Supp. 1989)) (citation and
footnote omitted). The Court went on to hold that upon a factual showing to support a reasonable,
good-faith belief that the crime-fraud exception applied, the trial court could engage in an in camera
examination of the communications between an attorney and client to see if the communications
were privileged and that the party opposing the privilege could use any nonprivileged evidence to
support its request for the in camera review. Id. at 2631-32.
78. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S.Ct. 439 (1988), illustrates the obvious point that if a
Rule does not have a plain meaning, the plain-meaning standard cannot be applied. The issue in that
case was whether Rule "803(8)(C), which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for public investigatory reports containing 'factual findings,' extends to conclusions and opinions contained in such
reports." Id. at 443. The Court indicated that its analysis went beyond examining the language of
the provision only because those words did not have an inescapable plain meaning:
Because the Federal Rules of Evidence are a legislative enactment, we turn to the
"traditional tools of statutory construction," in order to construe their provisions. We
begin with the language of the Rule itself....
..To say the least, the language of the Rule does not compel us to reject the interpretation that "factual findings" includes conclusions or opinions that flow from a factual
investigation. Second, we note that, contrary to what is often assumed, the language of the
Rule does not state that "factual findings" are admissible, but that "reports... setting forth
...factual findings" (emphasis added) are admissible. On this reading, the language of the
Rule does not create a distinction between "fact" and "opinion" contained in such reports.
Id. at 446-47 (citations omitted). Only after reaching these conclusions about the relevant language
did the Court go on to examine the Rule's legislative history, the practicality of competing interpretations, and the policy effects of its conclusion. See id. at 447-50.
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subscribe to this standard. 79 If the reasoning and rationales of Supreme
Court decisions are to be taken seriously,80 then the Court has clearly
indicated that the plain-meaning standard now controls the interpretation of all the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The plain-meaning standard, however, has not controlled all applications of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Instead of always following the
precise language of a Rule, courts have many times based their interpre81
tations on legislative history, the common law, and evidentiary policies.
That, of course, should change now that literalism is preeminent. Litigators, judges, and scholars should reexamine the entire Federal Rules of
Evidence in light of the Supreme Court's plain-meaning standard. A
greatly changed evidence law will result.
III.

Hypothetical Applications of the Plain-Meaning Standard to the
Federal Rules of Evidence

A.

The Notice Requirement of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions

The plain-meaning standard gives an answer to a continuing controversy over the notice requirement of the residual hearsay exceptions.
The notice requirement provides:
[A] statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name
79. Huddleston, for example, was a unanimous decision. See Huddleston v. United States, 485
U.S. 681, 682 (1988).
80. If the Supreme Court's reasoning is not taken seriously there are other plausible explanations for the Court's Federal Rules of Evidence decisions. For example, one could cynically conclude that the controlling force of the major plain-meaning decisions is simply that in each case the
Government won and a criminal defendant lost. More neutrally, one might note that each recent
Supreme Court interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the wider admission of evidence, a policy that the Court may favor. In spite of the Court's explanations for its outcomes, plain
meaning might not control the results; instead the standard may have been selected to justify outcomes that were reached for other reasons. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 1315. Murphy observes:
Anyone who has ever taught legislation will attest to the speed with which his students
become totally cynical about the courts' good faith when interpreting statutes. It does not
take many instances of the same judge's embracing legislative history in one case and rejecting it in another to convince the already skeptical student that courts decide first how
they want the case to come out and then find the evidence to support the result.
Id.
81. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 629 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir.) (arguing that in order to fill gaps
and omissions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, both the policies behind the Rule and its commonlaw basis must be examined), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1980); S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL at xlii (4th ed. 1986) (noting that the advisory committee
notes "containD a wealth of authority to which Judges and lawyers may wish to refer to understand
the Rule ....
Moreover, it is the beginning of a 'legislative' history that is all important in understanding how the final draft came into being").
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and address of the declarant.8 2
8 3 It
The notice requirement prevents surprise to the adversary.
guarantees the opponent a reasonable chance to combat the hearsay.
This purpose, of course, might be satisfied in some cases even if the notice is not given in advance of trial. Not unexpectedly, the majority of
courts considering the question have rejected a rigid interpretation of the
provision when the goal of the notice requirement can still be met.8 4 For
example, one court wrote:
We believe that the purpose of the rules and the requirement
of fairness to an adversary contained in the advance notice requirement of Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) are satisfied when, as
here, the proponent of the evidence is without fault in failing to
notify his adversary prior to trial and the trial judge has offered
sufficient time, by means of granting a continuance, for the party
against whom the evidence
is to be offered to prepare to meet and
85
contest its admission.
Such flexibility may be a sensible policy, 86 but sensible policies are
82. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (identical language appears in both Rules). The two
residual hearsay exceptions were highly controversial. At the very end of the drafting process, the
conference committee inserted the notice provision. See Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay
Rule: The ResidualHearsayExceptions, CircumstantialGuaranteesof Trustworthiness, and Grand
Jury Testimony, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 431, 438-40 (1986).
83. See

JOINT EXPLANATORY

STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, CONF. REP.

No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7098, 7106
(indicating that "this notice must be given sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide
any adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to contest the use of the statement").
84. See United States v. Calson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976) (asserting that the notice
requirement of Rule 804(b)(5) "should not be an inflexible and imposing barrier to the admissibility
of probative evidence when the peculiar circumstances of a case militate against its invocation"),
cert denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. laconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976)
(arguing that "[p]re-trial notice should clearly be given if at all possible, and only in those situations
where requiring pre-trial notice is wholly impracticable, as here, should flexibility be accorded"),
cerL denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
85. United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978); accordCarlson, 547 F.2d at 1355;
laconetti, 540 F.2d at 578; see also Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the FederalHearsay
Rule" Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 867, 901 (1982) (concluding that a
majority of the courts have "imparted sufficient flexibility to permit the admission of hearsay ,under
the residual exceptions despite the absence of pretrial notice to the adverse party when the proponent
has not become aware of the need to offer such evidence until after trial has commenced"); cf
United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that Congress intended the notice
provision of Rule 803(24) to be rigidly construed); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 73 n.30 (2d
Cir. 1977) (asserting that "It]here is absolutely no doubt that Congress intended that the requirement of advance notice be rigidly enforced").
86. See Sonenshein, supra note 85, at 904. Sbnenshein presents the following argument for a
flexible approach to the notice requirement:
Given the uncertain nature of the trial process, there will be occasions when a conscientious and farsighted litigator will be faced with situations of genuine surprise, which could
not have reasonably been anticipated. The flexible view satisfies the purpose of the notice
requirements, which is to provide adequate time for the opponent to prepare, placing the
opponent in no worse position than he would have faced had pretrial notice been given.
Id.; see Piva v. Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1981). The Piva court noted:
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not relevant to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rules. Instead,
the plain language controls. The plain language of the notice provision
not only fails to authorize such flexibility; it flatly forbids it. Trial judges
cannot admit evidence under Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) unless the pro87
ponent of the evidence has given notice in advance of trial.
B.

Novel Scientific Evidence

Rule 702 governs the admission of novel scientific evidence in federal courts. That Rule states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
88
form of an opinion or otherwise.
The purpose of the notice requirement is to give adverse parties an opportunity to
attack the trustworthiness of the evidence. Piva had ample opportunity to do so, and the
record shows that her attorney extensively cross-examined the preparers of the exhibit
concerning the original data on which it was based and the actual construction of the
exhibit. In addition, Piva had more than a year after the admission of the evidence until
the end of the trial on her individual claims to move to strike the exhibit or rebut it with
additional evidence.
Id.; cf R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 41, at 504 (arguing against a flexible approach
because the notice requirement serves several purposes in addition to providing the adversary with a
chance to attack the reliability of the proffered evidence).
87. See, e.g., R. LEMPERT & S.SALTZBURG, supra note 41, at 504 (noting succinctly that "[i]f
there is one portion of the residual exceptions that seems invulnerable to judicial discretion, it is the
[notice] requirement"); Sonenshein, supra note 85, at 904 (noting that "[t]he language of Rules
803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) unequivocally require pretrial notice"); Yasser, StrangulatingHearsay:
The ResidualExceptions to the HearsayRule, 11 TEX.TECH L. REv. 587, 608 (1980) ("The advance
notice requirement is so clearly stated that to sidestep it is to flirt with lawlessness.").
Thus, Judge Jack B. Weinstein and Professor Margaret A. Berger are just ignoring the plain
language of the Rules when they contend that the Rules can be complied with without pretrial
notice. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE,

1 803(24)[01],

at 803-380

(1987) (asserting that "[i]f the question arises during trial through no fault of the proponent-something bound to occur from time to time, no matter how careful is discovery-the court can comply
with the rule by granting a continuance").
88. FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 703, in defining the acceptable basis for an expert opinion, also
helps govern the admissibility of scientific evidence:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703; see McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility,
67 IowA L. REv. 879, 888 (1982). McCormick asserts:
[R]ule 703 also may have some bearing on the [admissibility of scientific evidence]. The
second sentence of rule 703 allows an expert to base an opinion on data that could not have
been admitted in evidence, provided it is of the type reasonably relied on by experts in
forming opinions in that field. The expert is not limited to reliance on data that have
achieved general acceptance.
Id.; cf Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 600 n.16 (1988)
(noting that "[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence contain no explicit requirement that the reasoning that
underlies a scientific opinion conform to any standard" and that "[s]ome courts have used Rule 702
or Rule 703 to exercise control in this area").
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Under the plain-meaning standard, all scientific evidence is admissible if it helps the jury decide the case properly. Jurors can best determine
a material issue when they have as much pertinent information about the
issue as possible. 89 Information is pertinent to a material issue when it
changes the likelihood of that issue. 90 The plain meaning of Rule 702,
thus, incorporates the basic relevancy principle, for "by definition relevant evidence helps to prove a fact of consequence to the case." 91
Rule 702, however, is not merely a reiteration of the relevancy provisions; 92 Rule 702 expands relevancy by explicitly allowing the admission of expert evidence that helps explain other relevant evidence. Under
the plain-meaning standard, judges will admit evidence claimed to be scientific because the only "scientific" test that does not fall within the lit93
eral words of Rule 702 is a meaningless or superfluous one.
This interpretation, of course, means the end of the Frye94 or "general acceptance" test, which dominated the standards for admission of
novel scientific evidence at the time Congress adopted the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 95 The Frye test, taken from a 1923 case rejecting the admissibility of a form of polygraph evidence, states:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de89. See Black, supra note 88, at 628 n.158 ("'Any relevant conclusions supported by a qualified
expert witness should be received unless there are distinct reasons for exclusion.' ") (quoting E.
CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 608 (3d ed. 1984)).
90. Rule 401 pertains to materiality: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. Rule
403 adds a balancing test: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. Taken together, the Rules support the fact that information becomes
pertinent to a material issue when it changes the likelihood of the issue.
91. G. LILLY, supra note 41, at 33; see also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 87, 1
702[02], at 702-11 (concluding simply that "[t]he helpfulness test subsumes a relevancy analysis").
92. Rule 401 also defines relevancy. For the text of Rule 401, see supra note 90. Rule 402
states that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R.
EVID. 402.
93. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (asserting that "[w]hether the situation is
a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier"
and that "[w]hen opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous
and a waste of time"); see also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 87, 702[02], at 702-11
(concluding that "[e]xpert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant
and, ergo, non-helpful"); cf United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that Rule 702's helpfulness requirement "necessarily implies a quantum of reliability beyond that
required to meet a standard of bare logical relevance," but failing to explain how relevant evidence
could ever fail to assist the trier of fact).
94. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
95. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234.
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fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general
96
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Neither the Rules nor their history explicitly mention Frye's continuation. 9 7 Many courts and commentators have interpreted this silence,
like the Rules' silence about Glasser and Nixon, 98 to mean that the Frye
test still applies. 99 The plain-meaning standard, however, as Bouraily
and Huddleston indicate, forbids judges from imposing procedural or
substantive requirements in addition to those contained in the actual
words of the applicable provision. If the Frye test or some other standard
for gauging the admission of novel scientific evidence means something
more than Rule 702's language-"assist the trier of fact"-it is not part
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 100 Courts used the Frye test because
they wanted to produce uniform rulings with precedential effect, counter
the possibility that jurors may view science as having mystic infallibility,
and make sure that experts will be available to both sides.10 ' These concerns are not part of Rule 702. They might be factors that a sensible
evidentiary system would consider in establishing rules for the admission
of scientific evidence, but because they are not in Rule 702's words, they
cannot be considered by a court deciding whether novel scientific evidence is admissible.
96. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
97. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234; McCormick, supra note 88, at 888; cf 3 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 87, 702[03], at 702-16 (asserting that "[tihe silence of the rule and its
drafters should be regarded as tantamount to an abandonment of the general acceptance standard").
98. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring that expert
testimony be "based upon a reliable area of expertise as has come to be embodied in the rule associated with [Frye]"); S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 81, at 633 (indicating that "[i]t would
be odd if the Advisory Committee and the Congress intended to overrule the vast majority of cases
excluding such evidence as lie detectors without explicitly stating so"); Giannelli, The Admissibility
ofNovel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197,
1229 (1980) ("[It can be argued that because Frye was the established rule and no statement repudiating Frye appears in the legislative history, the general acceptance standard remains intact."); see
also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 87, 1 702[03], at 702-17 to -18 (observing that "[a]
iumber of federal courts have responded to the enactment of Rule 702 by rejecting the Frye standard, but at this writing a number of Circuits still predicate the admission of scientific evidence on
general acceptance in the community").
100. See Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 254, 257 (1984) ("The difference between
the Frye approach and the 'relevancy' approach is immediately apparent. Frye imposes a special
burden on the proponent of novel scientific evidence that other types of evidence are not subject tothe technique must be generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.").
101. See McCormick, supra note 88, at 904; see also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (asserting that the conservative Frye test is necessary because "scientific proof may
in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen").
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The plain-meaning standard not only erases the Frye test, it also
introduces considerable uncertainty into Rule 702 determinations. Rule
702's words do incorporate some concern for the unreliability of testimony based on novel science. If a new test is not reliable or accurate,
then testimony based on it will fail Rule 702's requirement that it "assist
the trier of fact." Evidence based on spurious science will not help the
jury in deciding the case, but will only present irrelevancies. The problem is that someone has to determine whether a scientific test is reliable

before a juror can rely on it. This preliminary issue seems difficult, especially because trial judges will seldom have the expertise to assess scientific worth, 10 2 but the solution to this difficulty under the plain-meaning
standard is that the judge does not decide scientific reliability. The admission of scientific evidence is a question of conditional relevancy. Tes-

timony based on the scientific test aids the jury if it is relevant; it is
relevant only if the test is reliable. 10 3 As Huddleston made clear, the
judge has a minimal role in the factual resolution of conditional relevancy. The court does not use Frye or any other standard to determine

for itself whether the proffered evidence is reliable enough to help the
jury decide the case. The trial judge only "decides whether the jury
could reasonably find the conditional fact. ' ' 0 Therefore, relevant scientific evidence based upon tests of uncertain accuracy and validity are ad05
missible if the jury could reasonably find the tests to be reliable.
102. See 3 J.WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 87, 702[03], at 702-34 to -35 (noting that,
before admitting scientific evidence, the judge must determine whether the information is sufficiently
reliable to assist the jury and observing that "the court almost never will have sufficient personal
expertise to evaluate the validity of the new development").
103. See Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of PreliminaryFacts
Conditioningthe Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.577, 598 (1984).
104. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988); see supranotes 43-46 and accompanying text.
105. Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried made a similar argument that Rule 901(a), the basic
authentication provision, requires conditional relevancy principles to be applied to scientific evidence. Rule 901(a) states: "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what its proponent claims." FED. R. EvID. 901(a). This Rule, of course, merely restates the
conditional relevancy doctrine of Rule 104(b). Imwinkelried argued that "the most sensible interpretation is that the rule applies to the preliminary fact of a scientific principle's validity." Imwinkelried, supra note 103, at 608. He draws support for his conclusion from one of the
authentication illustrations, Rule 901(b), which provides: "By way of illustration only, and not by
way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the
requirements of this rule: ...Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and
showing that the process or system produces an accurate result." FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9). The
advisory committee note to this provision indicates that it was meant to cover X-rays and computers. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) advisory committee's note. Imwinkelried concluded that because the Rule was clearly meant to apply to these scientific techniques, "one may reasonably infer
that the drafters intend the rule to apply to any other variety of scientific evidence." Imwinkelried,
supra note 103, at 609.
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1240 n.21 (3d Cir. 1985), rejects this analysis, distin-
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The plain-meaning standard applied to Rule 702, however, may not
remove all reliability determinations from the court. Relevant expert testimony will not assist the jury, and is therefore not admissible under Rule
702, when that testimony will so confuse the jury that it cannot properly
weigh the evidence, when the jurors will be overimpressed with the expert testimony and give it undue weight, or when the testimony wastes
the jury's time by repeating the obvious. An expert opinion may-as
Rule 403 provides--"be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
06
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'
Rule 702, however, is not merely subject to the balancing of Rule
403; 107 Rule 702 actually incorporates into itself Rule 403-like concerns.
This distinction can make a difference. Rule 403 authorizes the exclusion of evidence only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the
evidence's probative value. The balance must be more than slightly
tipped; the scale must plummet to the side of prejudice. The plain-meaning standard, however, does not indicate whether the same balancing test
must be used in Rule 702. Does Rule 702-evidence become unhelpful to
the jury when the prejudice simply outweighs the probative value or only
when the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value? If the
guishing the well-established principles of x-rays and computers from novel scientific techniques.
Downing, however, ignores the fact that nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates that
scientific techniques like x-rays should be distinguished from novel science. Downing instead saw a
parallel between novel scientific evidence and hearsay. See id. at 1237 n. 15. The Third Circuit noted
that the trial court must determine that the requirements of a hearsay exception have been met
before the hearsay can be admitted under an exception. See id. "These conditions on the admission
of hearsay seem to ensure a level of trustworthiness such that the testimony is likely to enhance the
truthseeking function of litigation. A preliminary determination that a scientific technique is reliable
serves a similar purpose." Id. If determining whether the definition of a hearsay exception has been
met was the same as determining reliability, then the trial judge would have to decide whether the
preponderance of the evidence supported reliability. See United States v. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171,
176 (1987) (holding that before a statement can be admitted as a coconspirator statement, the trial
court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) have
been satisfied). But they are not the same. The logical relevancy of an out-of-court statement does
not depend on whether the definition of a hearsay exception has been satisfied. A statement made
during the concealment phase of a crime is relevant whether or not the concealment is considered
part of the conspiracy. A statement made too late to be considered an excited utterance may still
have probative value. On the other hand, testimony based on a scientific test is only probative if the
test works. The scientific reliability is an essential link in the logical chain that makes the testimony
relevant. If the test is not reliable, then the evidence is irrelevant. The reliability, like the determination of whether the prior act in Huddleston was a crime, is a condition precedent for the relevancy of
the evidence; it is a question of conditional relevancy.
106. FED. R. EVID. 403.
107. See, eg., United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1986). "[O]therwise admissible
expert testimony may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers
that it might confuse the issues, be unfairly prejudicial, cause undue delay or waste judicial resources." Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 403).
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higher standard of Rule 403 does not apply, of course, the trial judge will
have greater leeway to exclude testimony based upon novel scientific procedures under Rule 702 than under Rule 403. The language of Rule 702
does not provide a clear answer.
Because Rule 702 does require some degree of balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice, the court, before admitting the evidence,
must assess how strongly the evidence tends to prove a fact in issue. This
assessment, of course, requires the judge to determine the reliability of
the scientific test. This requirement resurrects the question of how the
judge should make the reliability determination. Even under the plainmeaning scheme, Rule 702 seems to cry out for Frye or some other standard to assess scientific reliability. Once again, however, Huddleston's
plain-meaning interpretation forecloses the use of such a standard.
The Huddleston Court concluded that Rule 404(b) contains no special procedures for the admission of evidence of other crimes offered for a
proper purpose, but that such evidence was still subject to Rule 403 balancing. Huddleston had argued that unless the trial court first found by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the prior
crime, the trial court must find, under Rule 403, that the unfair prejudice
from the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value.10 8 The
Court, however, rejected "this suggestion because Rule 403 admits of no
such gloss and because such a holding would be erroneous for the same
reasons that a preliminary finding under Rule 104(a) is inappropriate." 10 9 Similarly, the assistance-to-the-trier standard of Rule 702 admits
of no such gloss as a fixed procedural or substantive test for measuring
the reliability of expert testimony. The trial judge, therefore, can use no
such test in determining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 702.
The judge must determine scientific reliability while balancing probative
value versus prejudice on a case-by-case basis-the same ad hoe approach that the plain-meaning standard mandates for assessing the admissibility of evidence of other crimes. 110
108. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689 n.6.
109. Id. The Court continued: "We do, however, agree with the Government's concession at
oral argument that the strength of the evidence establishing the similar act is one of the factors the
court may consider when conducting the Rule 403 balancing." Id.
110. Some of the Frye concerns may make their way into this ad hoe balancing. See, eg., McCormick, supra note 88, at 879-80. McCormick notes:
[T]he trial court has the right to assess the strength of the foundation for admissibility.
That includes the right to know the accuracy and reliability of the technique on which the
evidence is based. When the error rate is unknown, undisclosed, or unreasonably high, the
trial court is justified in excluding the evidence. Lack of consensus in the scientific community concerning this factor may lead the trial or appellate court to conclude that the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because of the uncertainty concerning the evidence's trustworthiness. In appropriate
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Applying the plain-meaning standard to novel scientific evidence
will, thus, have a number of effects. For example, because the limited
judicial screening function must be done on a case-by-case basis, there
will be less consistency as to whether a particular scientific procedure is
admissible. This ad hoe approach will lead to fewer meaningful precedents on the admissibility of scientific evidence, and trial courts, therefore, may be confronted with even more litigation concerning scientific
evidence.
The plain-meaning standard will once again increase the complexity
of a juror's job. Because the Federal Rules of Evidence largely prohibit
the trial judge from determining reliability before admitting the evidence,
more dubious scientific evidence will be presented to the jury. Lay jurors, without any assistance from the trial judge, will increasingly have to
make the sophisticated determination of whether a piece of scientific evidence is truly reliable.
C. Rule 607 and Impeachment of a Party'sOwn Witness
The plain-meaning standard not only will resolve some present evidentiary controversies, such as those concerning notice for the residual
hearsay exceptions and the criteria for admitting scientific evidence, but
it will also reverse some settled practices. Rule 607, which allows the
party calling a witness to impeach that witness, provides: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling
the witness." 1
The Rule "raises the problem of the calling party's potential misuse
of impeachment by prior inconsistent statements."' 12 The problem occases the court may well consider the lack of consensus in the scientific community as a
factor that bears heavily on the admissibility decision.
Id. Weinstein and Berger also point out:
Whether or not the scientific principles involved have been generally accepted by experts in
the field may still have a bearing on reliability and consequent probative value of the evidence....
After assessing probative value, the court must also assess the dangers posed by this
particular kind of expert scientific evidence. The court will have to evaluate the degree to
which the jurors might be over-impressed by the aura of reliability surrounding the evidence, thereby leading them to abdicate their role of critical assessment....
In balancing the probative worth of the novel scientific evidence against the dangers
specified in Rule 403, the court must also consider such factors as the significance of the
issue to which the evidence is directed, the availability of other proof, and the utility of
limiting instructions.
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 87, 702[03], at 702-18 to -20 (footnote omitted).
111. FED. R. EVID. 607.
112.

M. GRAHAM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 161 (2d ed. 1987); see also 3

J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 87, %607[01], at 607-18 (discussing the fear of courts and
commentators that "a new route has been created for the admission of unreliable evidence in the
guise of impeaching one's own witnesses").
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curs because prior inconsistent statements are generally excluded for
their truth under the hearsay rule.' 13 A potential conflict with the hearsay rule arises when a trial witness testifies adversely to the calling party.
If the trial judge admits prior inconsistent statements under Rule 607, he
will instruct the jury that the statements are admitted only for use in
assessing the credibility of the witness. There is always the risk, how-

ever, that the jurors will ignore the instruction and treat the impeachment as substantive evidence, thus weighing the prior statement as

substantive evidence of the truth that it asserts. An implicit violation of
the hearsay rule would then result; indeed, this may have been the goal of
4
the party calling the witness."
Before Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Fourth
Circuit, in United States v. Morlang,115 held that a party could not attempt this evasion of hearsay doctrine.1 6 The party could not present an

unfavorable witness for the purpose of getting otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury:
While it is the rule in this circuit that a party calling a witness does
not vouch for his credibility, it has never been the rule that a party
may call a witness where his testimony is known to be adverse for
the purpose of impeaching him. To so hold would permit the government, in the name of impeachment, to present testimony to the
jury by indirection which would not otherwise be admissible.
... [I]mpeachment by prior inconsistent statement may not be
permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge to get before the

113. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 34, at 73 (3d ed. 1984).
114.
Congress' failure to permit substantive use of all prior inconsistent statements where the
declarant is presently available for cross-examination may force prosecutors, deprived of
what is potentially the most relevant evidence in their case, to engage in the subterfuge of
offering a statement for impeachment purposes in the hope that, despite the court's instruction to the contrary, the jury will give the statement substantive weight.
Ordover, Surprise! That Damaging Turncoat Witness Is Still with Us: An Analysis of FederalRules
of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 65, 66 (1976).
With a few exceptions, traditional evidence rules prohibit a party from impeaching its own
witness. This restriction makes little sense if prior inconsistent statements are excepted from the
hearsay rule and generally admitted for their truth. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
87, 607[01], at 607-18 ("Professor Chadbourn in his study for the California Law Revision Commission found that no reason for the no-impeachment rule existed if prior inconsisteht statements
were given substantive effect."). An early draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence proposed admission
of all prior inconsistent statements and accordingly removed the prohibition on impeachment of a
party's own witnesses. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1), 51 F.R.D. 315, 413 (1971) (Revised Proposed
Draft). The impeachment provision became enacted as Rule 607, but Congress rejected the draft's
position on inconsistent statements. Instead, it enacted present Rule 801(d)(1)(A), which generally
classifies prior inconsistent statements as inadmissible hearsay. Thus, prior inconsistent statements
used to impeach are generally excluded for their truth.
115. 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975).
116. Id. at 190.
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jury evidence not otherwise admissible.1 17
This limitation makes sense. If a party knows that a witness will not
give testimony useful for his case, he has no legitimate reason to call the
witness; indeed, he probably would not put that witness on the stand but
for the impeaching material. It is improper to present a witness with the
hope that the jury will disregard the judge's instructions. Courts should
not sanction an intentional effort to evade the rules of evidence. Forbidding a party from calling witnesses for the sole purpose of impeachment
18
helps prevent evasion.'
The Morlangdoctrine is so sensible' 9 that every circuit considering
117. Id. at 189-90 (citation omitted).
118. The key factor in determining the propriety of impeachment under Morlang is whether the
impeaching party knew before calling the witness that the witness would give testimony useless to
the party calling the witness. Compare United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192-93 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that the impeachment was not improper, the court said that "there was no bad faith
here" and noting that "[w]e do not see how in these circumstances it can be thought that the prosecutor put [the witness] on the stand knowing he would give no useful evidence") with United States
v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the impeachment was error because the
prosecution knew what the witness would say, the court said that "[t]he primary if not sole purpose
in calling him to testify again was focused on getting [his] prior statements before the jury"), aff'd in
relevantpart, 771 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1986).
119. See, e.g., Webster, 734 F.2d at 1192. The Webster court observed:
[I]t would be an abuse of [Rule 607], in a criminal case, for the prosecution to call a witness
that it knows would not give it useful evidence, just so it could introduce hearsay evidence
against the defendant in the hope that the jury would miss the subtle distinction between
impeachment and substantive evidence-or, if it didn't miss it, would ignore it. The purpose would not be to impeach the witness but to put in hearsay as substantive evidence
against the defendant, which Rule 607 does not contemplate or authorize.
Id. At least one commentator has also noted:
Congress has insisted on maintaining the hearsay bar to the substantive use of informal
prior inconsistent statements. Given that policy declaration by Congress, where the government has advance knowledge that its witness has recanted, it is absurd to allow it to
create confusion and prejudice against itself by (a) putting the witness on the stand and (b)
then claiming that the confusion so created mandates that it be permitted to impeach the
witness by introducing an out-of-court statement which is highly prejudicial and which
cannot be used as substantive evidence.
Ordover, supra note 114, at 72-73.
Prior to the enactment of the Rules, a party could not impeach its own witness with a prior
inconsistent statement unless it "could convince the court that it was both surprised and affirmatively damaged by the witness' in-court testimony." Id. at 67; see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 87, 1 607[01], at 607-10 to -12 (listing the circumstances under which a party could
impeach his own witness). "[Tihe surprise and affirmative damage tests were formulated as a deterrent to prosecutorial violation of both the vouching and hearsay rules." Ordover, supra note 114, at
72. Professor Michael H. Graham has argued that the surprise and damage requirements be read
into Rule 607 to preserve the policies of the hearsay rule. See Graham, The Relationship Among
FederalRules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A), and 403: A Reply to Weinstein's Evidence, 55 TEXAS
L. REV. 573, 576 (1977) (arguing that the use of established common-law principles presents fewer
practical difficulties than a case-by-case analysis); Graham, Examination of a Party's Own Witness
Under the FederalRules ofEvidence: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 TEXAS L. REv. 917, 966-72 (1976)
(arguing that the revision of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) mandates the reimposition of the traditional requirements). Courts have not adopted this position. See, e.g., Hogan, 763 F.2d at 702 (holding that
"[t]he government may call a witness it knows may be hostile, and it may impeach that witness's
credibility. Surprise is not a necessary prerequisite to impeaching one's own witness under FRE
607"); see also Webster, 734 F.2d at 1193 (asserting that "it would be a mistake to graft [a surprise
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it under the Federal Rules of Evidence has continued the restriction. 120
Moreover, the restriction existed when the Rules were adopted, and no
comments by the drafters specifically indicate an intent to remove it.
Sensible policy, widespread judicial approval, and no stated intention to
change are all good reasons to conclude that the Federal Rules of Evidence preserve the Morlang restriction.
Such factors, however, cannot compel a result when the language of
a Rule is plain on its face. According to the Supreme Court, judges must
apply the literal words, and the words of Rule 607 contain no restrictions.' 21 The plain language of the Rule permits impeachment without
limitation.1 22 The Morlang doctrine is no longer part of federal evidence
law.
A party, therefore, can impeach a witness that he calls as long as the
witness gives relevant evidence. The party does not have to call the witness in good faith to be able to impeach the witness-the calling party
can be aware that the witness will testify adversely. 23 The only restriction is Rule 403's general requirement that the potential for unfair prejudice, due to the impeachment, not substantially outweigh the testimony's
24
probative value.1
and harm] requirement to Rule 607, even if such a graft would be within the power of judicial
interpretation of the rule").
120. "Although Morlang was decided before the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective, the
limitation that we have quoted on the prosecutor's rights under Rule 607 has been accepted in all
circuits that have considered the issue." Webster, 734 F.2d at 1192; accord Hogan, 763 F.2d at 702
("Every circuit to consider this question has ruled similarly."). Morlang's restriction preventing
impeachment of a party's own witness has been applied in civil, as well as criminal, cases. See, eg.,
Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356, 1358 n.2 (lth Cir. 1986) (noting that "a
witness may not be called solely for the purpose of impeaching him and thereby obtaining otherwise
inadmissible testimony"); Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1979) ("To use a
prior inconsistent statement [to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible] exceeds the
scope of impeachment, and is an attempt to use hearsay evidence for substantive purposes.").
121. "[A] literal interpretation of Rule 607 [imposes] no restriction ... upon impeachment by a
party of his own witness with a nonsubstantively admissible prior inconsistent statement." M. GRAHAM, supra note 112, at 162.
122. The advisory committee's note to Rule 607 begins: "The traditional rule against impeaching one's own witness is abandoned as based on false premises."
123. Rule 404(b) provides an appropriate analogy. Evidence admitted for a proper purpose
under that Rule can be misused. Even so, because the plain language of Rule 404(b) contains no
good-faith requirement, it cannot be read into the provision. Even if the defendant could show the
Government's bad faith, i.e., that the goal was to have the jury misuse the evidence as impermissible
character evidence, Rule 404(b) would not bar the evidence. Instead, the only restriction on the
admissibility of such evidence would be the generally applicable one of Rule 403. See supra note 109
and accompanying text.
124. The intention of the party cannot be imported into the Rule 403 balancing because the
party's intention does not appear in the plain language of that Rule. Instead, Rule 403's concerns
are only with unfair prejudice, misleading the jury, and wasting time.
This plain-language interpretation of Rule 607 was foreshadowed by 3 J. WEINsTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 87, 607[01], at 607-20. Weinstein and Berger ask, "[i]nstead of placing so
much emphasis on the motive of the profferer, an approach more consistent with the underlying
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Agency Admissions by Government Employees

Before Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, criminal
defendants could not introduce statements by Government employees as
agency admissions 125 against the Government. The Court in United
States v. Santos,126 gave the reasons for this restriction. 12 7 Santos was
charged with assaulting a federal drug agent. 128 A different federal agent
identified in a sworn affidavit someone other than Santos as the assailant. 129 The defendant sought to introduce this statement as an admission
against the Government. 130 The appellate court concluded that although
this evidence could have been used on cross-examination to impeach the
agent who signed it, because of the Government's unique status as a
party, the statement did not constitute an agency admission that could be
admitted for its truth.131
policy of the federal rules of evidence would be to analyse the problem in terms of Rule 403-is the
probative value of the impeaching evidence outweighed by its prejudicial impact?" Id. They also
seem to suggest, however, that the traditional requirements of surprise and damage ought to be
factored into the Rule 403 balancing. See id. % 607[01], at 607-21 to -22 ("In most cases, of course,
the Rule 403 analysis and the surprise-damage requirement will lead to the same result."); see also
Ordover, supra note 114, at 73 ("[B]arring a Congressional amendment, part of the probative valueprejudice analysis with respect to the credibility of the witness should include the questions of surprise and afirmative damage."). Surprise, however, is not part of Rule 403 balancing. Neither the
probative value nor the unfair prejudice of what was actually presented is affected by whether or not
the party knew what was coming on direct examination. On the other hand, damage should be
weighed. Impeachment of a neutral witness is not as probative as impeachment of an affirmatively
damaging one. Not much probative value is to be gained by impeaching with prior inconsistent
statements the apparent eyewitness who testifies that he does not remember the incident. Although
the jury may become dubious about the assertion, no substantive evidence has been presented about
the incident. If there is a chance that the prior inconsistent statement will be used as substantive
evidence, the potentially unfair prejudice may substantially outweigh any probative value. On the
other hand, if the witness testifies directly against the party calling him and testifies, for example,
that the defendant did not commit the crime, the probative value of the impeachment becomes much
greater. The trier of fact has heard substantive evidence of high probative value, and information
that attacks the credibility of this witness will then also have high probative value. Even if the
impeachment has a strong tendency to cause unfair prejudice, the impeachment may still be proper
because the potential for unfair prejudice may not substantially outweigh its probative value.
125. Under Rule 801(d)(2), a statement is not hearsay if.(1) it was made by a party's servant or
other agent, (2) it is offered against that party, (3) it was made during the existence of the agency or
employment relationship, and (4) it is related to a matter within the scope of the relationship. This is
true regardless of whether the statement would be hearsay in absence of the Rule. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 426, at 311 (1980).

126. 372 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1967).
127. See id. at 180-81.
128. Id. at 178.
129. Id. at 179.
130. Id.
131.
[Inconsistent out-of-court statements or actions of a government agent said or done in the
course of his employment take on quite a different probative character in a government
criminal case from that which inconsistent out-of-court acts of agents acting within the
scope of their employment generally take on at a trial. Though a government prosecution
is an exemplification of the adversary process, nevertheless, when the Government prosecutes, it prosecutes on behalf of all the people of the United States; therefore all persons,

774

The Changed Rules of Evidence
Conceding that this holding might seem grossly unfair because damaging statements by a defendant's agents are admissible for their truth,
the court concluded:
This apparent discrimination is explained by the peculiar posture
of the parties in a criminal prosecution-the only party on the government side being the Government itself whose many agents and
actors are supposedly uninterested personally in the outcome
of the
13 2
trial and are historically unable to bind the sovereign.
The plain-meaning standard discards the Santos doctrine. Although
the Rules' drafters were silent on the Santos doctrine, the literal words of
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) classify the statements of Government employees as
vicarious admissions.1 33 Rule 801(d)(2)(D) states that an admission by a
whether law enforcement agents, government investigators, complaining prosecuting witnesses, or the like, who testify on behalf of the prosecution, and who, because of an employment relation or other personal interest in the outcome of the prosecution, may happen to
be inseparably connected with the government side of the adversary process, stand in relation to the United States and in relation to the defendant no differently from persons unconnected with the effective development of or furtherance of the success of, the
prosecution.
Id. at 180.
132. Id. The Santos court indicated that similar statements would have been admissible in civil
cases. "Therefore, the inconsistent out-of-court statements of a government agent made in the
course of the exercise of his authority and within the scope of that authority, which statements
would be admissions binding upon an agent's principal in civil cases, are not so admissible here as
'evidence of the fact.'" Id. Other courts in pre-Rules cases followed Santos. See, eg., United States
v. Pandilidis, 524 F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1975) ("While evidence of contradictory statements may be
used to impeach a government agent, they may not be introduced to prove the truth of the statements offered."), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976); United States v. Powers, 467 F.2d 1089, 1093-95
(7th Cir. 1972) (adopting the rule in Santos and holding that statements by an IRS special agent did
not constitute vicarious admissions), cert denied, 410 U.S. 983 (1973). The logic ofSantos, however,
has not gone uncriticized.
To the suggestion that government agents are "uninterested personally" in the outcome of
government litigation, it may be replied that much the same may usually be said of agents
employed by private entities. It may be true that to some extent the sheer size of the
government and the protections accorded by the civil service system may combine to dissociate any one agent from success or failure in any one case, but there exist similar factors in
private industry, which sometimes involves massive entities and restrictions in the form of
federal and state regulations and clauses in union contracts which similarly dissociate any
one employee from success or failure in a single case. To the suggestion that agents are
"unable to bind the sovereign," it may be replied that this principle only restates (indeed,
overstates) the question, which is whether an agent should be able not to "bind" but to
make statements admissible against the sovereign.
4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 125, § 426, at 328.
The court in [Santos] seemed to be distinguishing government agents from nongovernment
agents (whose statements regarding matters within the scope of the agency may be attributed to their principals) on the rationale that government agents are "supposedly uninterested personallyin the outcome of the trial." The court did not explain the significance of
this premise. We are not told whether it follows that (a) it would be unfair to impute to the
government responsibility for the statements of its agents, or (b) such statements lack the
special assurances of trustworthiness that attend the out-of-court statements of nongovernment agents.
United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 937-38 n.11 (1978) (citations omitted) (citing United States
v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1967)).
133. A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is "a statement by
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party-opponent is an out-of-court statement offered against a party and is
"a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship." Under the plain-meaning standard, if the Government is a
party, then a criminal defendant may introduce the relevant statements
of the Government's agents or servants. Normal usage of language calls
the Government a party in a criminal case, and the Rules clearly contemplate this labelling. 134 Routine usage also classifies law enforcement personnel or other Government employees as agents or servants of the
Government. Consequently, under the plain-meaning standard, those
employees' out-of-court declarations concerning matters within their jobs
135
are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
Courts, however, routinely hold that statements by Government
employees are not vicarious admissions admissible in criminal cases. For
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment,
made during the existence of the relationship." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
134. For example, Rule 615 authorizes the exclusion of the opposing party's witnesses on request, but exempts "an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its
representative by its attorney." FED. R. EvID. 615. The advisory committee notes indicate that this
exemption was meant to include police officers in criminal cases. The Senate report is more explicit.
"Many district courts permit government counsel to have an investigative agent at counsel table
throughout the trial although the agent may be a witness. The practice is permitted as an exception
to the rule of exclusion...." SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
7051, 7072. Rule 803(8) authorizes the introduction of public records which are factual findings
resulting from lawful investigations "in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in
criminal cases." FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Rules 615 and 803(8) indicate that the Government is a
party in a criminal case. Compare Morgan, 581 F.2d at 937 n.10 (citing Rule 803(8): "[w]e note that
the Federal Rules clearly contemplate that the federal government is a party-opponent of the defendant in criminal cases, and specifically provide that in certain circumstances statements made by
government agents are admissible against the government as substantive evidence") with United
States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1246 n.16 (7th Cir. 1979) (concluding Rule 803(8) "would be
unnecessary if Rule 801(d)(2)(D) were found to encompass admissions by government employees").
Kampiles is wrong. Rule 803(8) serves purposes even if statements of Government employees are
admitted as agency admissions. For example, Rule 803(8) allows factual findings in public records
to be introduced on behalf of the Government or where the Government is not a party in civil cases.
This effect is not made redundant by admitting agency admissions against the Government. Rule
803(8) also allows the admission of factual findings from a government that is not the party in a
criminal case. Thus, state public records, under Rule 803(8), can be introduced in a federal criminal
prosecution. Rule 803(8) is not superfluous simply because Government employees' statements are
introducible as vicarious admissions.
135. Compare P. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
§ 5.02, at 409 (1987) ("In light of the unqualified language of this rule, why wouldn't it be more
reasonable to interpret it as applying to government employees unless there is some indication in the

rule's history that the drafters intended that the Government be excepted from it in criminal cases?")
with United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D.D.C. 1980) (stating that a
reason for rejecting the Government's position in a civil case that statements made by Government
employees could not be agency admissions "is that its arguments would apply with equal force to
any large organization with many individuals speaking and acting on its behalf.... [and noting that
t]he unambiguous language of Rule 801(d)(2) clearly does not contemplate such a result").
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example, in United States v. Kampiles,136 the Seventh Circuit, noting the
pre-Rules doctrine that "admissions by government employees in criminal cases were viewed as outside the admissions exception to the hearsay
rule," 137 summarized the reasoning of Santos,13 8 and concluded: "Nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence suggests an intention to alter the
traditional rule and defendant has cited no truly contrary case indicating
139
such a trend."
Bourjaily, however, expressly rejects Kampiles' reasoning. Because
plain meaning has triumphed over evidentiary history and legislative silence in the interpretation of coconspirator statements, it must also control the scope of agency admissions. Statements of Government agents
are thus admissible against the Government. 140 Indeed, some civil courts
have recognized that the language of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) requires this result. 14 1 Of course, if the language requires this result in civil cases, it also
136. 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
137. Id. at 1246.
138. Citing Santos, the court stated: "Because the agents of the Government are supposedly
disinterested in the outcome of a trial and are traditionally unable to bind the sovereign, their statements seem less the product of the adversary process and hence less appropriately described as
admissions of a party." Id. (citation omitted).
139. Id. The defendant did cite United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
defendant in Morgan sought to introduce out-of-court statements from an informant to a detective.
This hearsay was characterized as "reliable" by the Government in a search warrant application.
See id. at 934. Although Morgan said that it is not clear whether the cases holding that Government
agents' statements could not be introduced as vicarious admissions survived the Federal Rules, see
id. at 938 n. 15, the court held that the informant's statements were admissible because the Government had adopted them by presenting them as reliable to a magistrate. Id. at 937.
Other courts have accepted Kampiles' logic that the Santos doctrine survives because of legislative silence. See United States v. Durrani, 659 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (D. Conn. 1987), aff'd, 835 F.2d
410 (2d Cir. 1987); see also United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that the "[d]efendant cannot use the internal reports of Justice Department attorneys, expressing the opinions of individual government employees, as admissions against
the Government").
140. Cf Morgan, 581 F.2d at 938 n.15 ("[Tihere is no indication in the history of the Rules that
the draftsmen meant to except the government from operation of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) in criminal
cases."); 4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 125, § 426, at 328 ("Certainly nothing on the
face or in the history of Rule 801(d)(2) suggests that the admissions doctrine does not apply to
statements by government agents."). Indeed, the drafters contemplated wide admissibility of admissions. "The freedom which admissions have enjoyed from technical demands of searching for an
assurance of trustworthiness in some against-interest circumstance, and from the restrictive influences of the opinion rule and the rule requiring firsthand knowledge.., calls for generous treatment
of this avenue to admissibility." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note. Quite clearly,
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) was meant to expand the common law's notion of agency admissions. See FED.
R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) advisory committee's note.
141. See, eg., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp 353, 357-58 (D.D.C. 1980)
(rejecting, in a civil antitrust action, the Government's claim that statements made by Government
officials outside the Justice Department were not agency admissions). The court concluded: "[T]he
admissibility of an admission by a party-opponent is a consequence, not of trustworthiness or lack of
burdensomeness, but of the adversary system of litigation.... The adversaries in this litigation...
are the United States of America and the American Telephone and Telegraph Company .... " Id.;
see also Corrigan v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 720, 727 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1985), rev'd, 815 F.2d 954
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987). Corriganwas a suit against the United States under the
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requires the result in criminal cases. Nothing in the language of Rule
801(d)(2)(D) makes any distinction between civil and criminal actions.
The plain-meaning standard allows the introduction of agency admissions under the Federal Rules of Evidence against the Government in all
cases. 142

E.

PriorIdentifications in Civil Cases

The plain-meaning standard will not only have an effect on past and
present evidentiary disputes, but it will lead to uncontemplated results.
Prior identifications in civil cases furnish an example.
Rule 801(d)(1)(C) permits out-of-court statements to be admitted
for their truth if the "declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement," and the statement is "one of identification of a person made after perceiving the perFederal Tort Claims Act for negligently serving alcohol to a person the Government should have
known was underage and intoxicated. The plaintiff in Corrigan,over objection, introduced the outof-court declarations of the bartender, a Government employee at a military club, who had served
the drinks. Id. The court concluded:
The disputed statements were offered against the United States, and were made by an agent
or servant of the United States, Mrs. Brown, concerning a matter within the scope of her
employment. Mrs. Brown's statements were made while she was still an employee of the
United States. Therefore, each element of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) has been met.
Id.; see also Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that in a civil suit
concerning mining claims, statements made by Forest Service employees could be considered against
the Government on a summary judgment motion); Burkey v. Ellis, 483 F. Supp. 897, 911 n. 13 (N.D.
Ala. 1979) (holding that in an injunction action against Government agencies, statements made by
Government officials in an environmental impact statement were introducible against the
Government).
142. Some state courts using evidence law based on the Federal Rules of Evidence, while accepting the notion that agency statements cannot be introduced against the government in a criminal
case, have, in effect, read an admissions doctrine into the business record exception. See, eg., State
v. Therriault, 485 A.2d 986, 993-97 (Me. 1984). In a rape trial, the prosecution objected to the
introduction of a state police crime laboratory report indicating no semen or foreign hairs had been
found. Id. at 990-9 1. The report had been signed by a trooper who had died by the time of trial. Id.
at 991. The court first rejected the notion that this report was an agency admission of the government, citing the pre-Rules federal cases and concluding, "[w]e find nothing in the Federal Rules of
Evidence nor in Maine's adoption of M.R.Evid. 801(d)(2) suggesting an intent to alter [this] rule
. " Id.....
at 992. The court then went on to admit the report as a business record, but indicated that
only the defendant would be permitted to introduce such a report under the business record
exception:
[flurther, even if we concede that the report was prepared in anticipation of litigation, it
was not offered by the party on whose behalf the report was made. The "prepared in
anticipation of litigation" argument carries no weight when the report is offered by the
party who did not request that the report be made.
Id. at 996. A doctrine that allows hearsay to be introduced only against the declarant and not by the
party-declarant is really an admissions doctrine. See State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Utah
1983) (admitting a police report against the prosecution under the business records exception and
concluding "that police reports of crimes should ordinarily be admitted when offered by the defendant in a criminal case to support his defense[, but w]hen offered by the prosecution, however, they
should ordinarily be excluded").

778

The Changed Rules of Evidence
son." 143 The drafters contemplated that this Rule would be used only in
criminal cases. The advisory committee cited only criminal cases and
statutes relating to criminal matters. 1 " Scholars commenting on this
provision do not consider the Rule's use in civil cases and assume that
issues about the provision arise only in criminal litigation. 14 5 Not surprisingly, my research has unearthed no civil case citing Rule
801(d)(1)(C).
The words of the Rule, however, do not limit it to criminal matters.
The prior identification provision, according to its plain meaning, applies
to civil cases. A few hypotheticals illustrate the profound effect such
application could have on hearsay doctrine.
Assume that a woman parks her car, asks some acquaintances to
watch it, and runs into a house. When she returns, all but one of her
acquaintances are gone and so is the car. When asked what happened to
the vehicle, the lingering person replies: "Defendant took it." The woman sues defendant for conversion of the car, but at trial the acquaintance testifies that Smith took it. The plaintiff, over an overruled
objection, then asks about the out-of-court statement. The acquaintance
denies making it, and later the plaintiff testifies that the acquaintance did
14 6
in fact tell her that defendant took the car.
Plaintiff's testimony about what the acquaintance said, of course,
could be introduced as impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement.
The truth of the out-of-court assertion, however, is not before the jury if
the plaintiff introduces the statement in this way. Instead, plaintiff
should introduce the acquaintance's statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(C)
as a prior identification. The witness said that the defendant took the
car, and that is a statement of identification just as plainly as if the witness had picked the defendant out of a police lineup. 147 If this were a
criminal proceeding, the statement would be admissible under Rule
801(d)(1)(C). Under the plain-meaning standard, it is also admissible in
the civil case.
Although the drafters may not have intentionally planned such a
broad provision, the plain language they chose is expansive. The literal
language of the Rule does not require a perception between the event
143. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
144. See id. advisory committee's note.
145. See, eg., E. CLEARY, supra note 113, § 251(c), at 747-48; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 87, 801(d)(1)(C)[01], at 801-176.
146. This is Problem IV-31 in E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 327 (1983).

147. Cf 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 87, 801(d)(1)(C)[01], at 801-174 (noting
that "Rule 801(d)(1)(C) applies regardless of when the prior identification was made-whether at
the scene of the crime, at a later chance encounter, or at a police line-up" (footnotes omitted)).
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which is the subject of the trial and the trial itself. 148 It only requires the
identification to be "made after perceiving the person."
Taken on its face, this restriction requires nothing more than that
she have firsthand knowledge of what she is identifying. If the declarant
saw the defendant commit a robbery, his out-of-court statement identifying the defendant is an identification "made after perceiving the person."
If the declarant did see the crime, the out-of-court statement is admissible at trial as long as the declarant is subject to cross-examination at
trial. 149
150
The words also place no time limit on the necessary perception,
and thus, the plain language permits the statement of identification to
come at any time after the person was perceived. The statement that
"White committed the robbery" falls within the provision even if made
long after the robbery and even without some sort of identification procedure.15 1 The statement satisfies the Rule's literal requirements simply
because the witness made the statement after perceiving the person.
The requirement that the statement be an identification is also easily
satisfied. The term "identification" is not defined, but certainly the declaration that "the robber is the third person from the left in the lineup" is
included or else the provision would have no purpose. If that statement
is an identification, then "defendant took the car," in response to the
148. Rule 801(d)(1)(C) "clearly contemplates the situation in which the declarant saw the crime
itself (or the subject in some situation which incriminates him) and later saw him again (typically in
a lineup) and then comments essentially, 'He's the one who did it,' thus identifying the person seen
later as the perpetrator." C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 40, at 211; cf FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee's note (concluding that the Rule is justified because of "the generally unsatisfactory and inconclusive nature of courtroom identifications as compared with those
made at an earlier time under less suggestive conditions"),
149. At one time, it might have been contended that the evidence was not admissible as a prior
identification because the witness was not "gubject to cross-examination concerning the statement."
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C). But cf 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 87,
801(d)(1)(C)[01], at 801-176 (questioning whether there can be adequate cross-examination of a witness "if the witness denies everything, or claims to have no present knowledge about the circumstances of the previous identification, and no recollection of the defendant at the time the crime
occurred").
Owens, however, definitively indicates that the hypothetical witness was subject to cross within
the meaning of the Rule. "Ordinarily a witness is regarded as 'subject to cross-examination' when he
is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions." United States v. Owens,
484 U.S. 554, 561 (1988). If the witness has voluntarily answered all questions, even if the answer is
a denial that the statement was made, the witness has been subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement.
150. The original drafts of this provision required the identification to be made "soon" after the
perception, but, at Justice Department urging, that limitation was dropped. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 87, 801(d)(1)(C)[01], at 801-169 to -170 (discussing the history of the
provision).
151. For example, if the day after the robbery, the declarant told the FBI that White was the
robber and White was his neighbor, and at trial the declarant states that he was mistaken in la1belling
White as the culprit, the out-of-court statement could be admitted for its truth.
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question of who stole the vehicle, is also an identification. Both are
words intended by the speaker to label someone; each statement identifies a person as a robber or thief.
The statement in the hypothetical that "defendant took the car,"
however, did not come in response to a question of, "Who did it?" Instead it answered, "What happened?" The answer to what happened did
not just label someone; it explained actions as well as identified actors.
Does the fact that the same statement came in response to the latter question remove it from the realm of an identification? If we give words their
normal meaning, the nature of the question cannot alter the classification
of the answer. The answer does more than just identify, but it still labels
the defendant as the actor. On its face, the reply to "What happened?" is
an identification within the reach of Rule 801(d)(1)(C).
Once it is seen that the plain language of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) covers
the statement in the hypothetical, "defendant took the car," then the provision's full effect under the plain-meaning standard becomes more clear.
For example, assume that two nurses are talking in the hospital cafeteria.
One says, "I was in surgery today and Dr. Black left a sponge inside a
patient." Is this statement admissible in a subsequent malpractice action? Assume that the statement is not an excited utterance or a present
sense impression. It is not a statement for medical diagnosis, and its
form precludes it from being a business record. But it is a statement
identifying a person. It identifies Dr. Black as having done the action.
The statement may be more than an identification; it may also relate
what happened, but it is still one naming Dr. Black as the person who
took some action. If the nurse is subject to cross-examination at the trial
about the statement, the statement is admissible under the plain-meaning
standard because it is an identifying declaration made after perceiving
the person.
If Rule 801(d)(1)(C) covers the nurse's statement, the Rule's grasp
is wide indeed. It takes in every utterance that names an individual doing something, or saying something, or being somewhere. All of these
are statements of identification. If the maker of such a statement is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, then the out-of-court
declaration is admissible for its truth. The plain meaning of Rule
801(d)(1)(C) thus leads to an unanticipated, but important change in accepted hearsay exclusions; courts are now obliged to admit an unprecedented array of identifying out-of-court statements under the plain
meaning of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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Effects of the Plain-Meaning Standard on the Law of Evidence

This Article has not examined various examples because they all
lead to a "right" or "wrong" result. Commentators can debate the wisdom of each plain meaning. 152 Not all plain meanings will lead to momentous changes. Some of the changes wrought by the plain-meaning
standard will affect many trials; others will affect just a handful. The
new readings will not consistently favor one party. Prosecutors, plaintiffs, and defendants will all be aided by some changes and hurt by
others. 153 The plain-meaning standard, however, will have one major
152. This Article explores the effects of the plain-meaning standard on the Federal Rules of
Evidence; it does not determine the "best" way to interpret them-if there is a "best" way.
As a general method of statutory interpretation, however, the plain-meaning standard has been
strongly criticized. For example, Kernochan notes:
There are many reasons why the literal or plain meaning approach should be abandoned ....
Pitched as it is in terms of the plain meaning of statutory words, it assumes
that words may have a single necessary meaning independent of their full context, without
regard to how those words were used. This is dangerous and unwise. At root, the literal
approach puts the wrong question. The question in human interchanges is not what the
words mean but what the user of the words meant by them.... If the communication is to
work well, the task must be in the first instance to ascertain not what the words as words
mean abstractly or to the court or as a matter of common usage but what the legislature
sought to convey when it employed them.
Kernochan, supra note 5, at 341 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, as Wald points out:
To stop at the purely literal meaning of a word, phrase, or sentence-if indeed the purely
literal meaning can be found-ignores reality. In the context of the statute, other related
statutes, or the problems giving rise to the statute, words may be capable of many different
meanings, and the literal meaning may be inapplicable or nonsensical.
Wald, supra note 4, at 199.
Others also see that plain meaning puts unrealistic demands on legislatures.
The invocation of the plain meaning rule results in an insistence upon specification and
attention to detail ....

...[T]here is a very real danger that this attitude may place a burden on legislatures
that they simply are not equipped to discharge. Except in special fields ... attempts by
legislatures to deal with the details of broad statutes have not been too successful. Moreover, preoccupation with detail often results in a failure to deal with tough policy questions
.... It could be tragic if the courts reinforce the belief that preoccupation with detail is the
appropriate way for legislators to behave.
Murphy, supra note 3, at 1313.
Of course, the application of the plain-meaning standard to the Federal Rules of Evidence is just
another example of our legal system's attempt to manage the ever-increasing number of statutes. As
Dean Guido Calabresi stated, "We are dealing with the slow adaptation of our whole legal-political
system to a major change: the preponderance of statutory law." G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 120 (1982). So far, "[tihere is no consensus on what courts should be
doing when they interpret statutes." Id. at 214 n.30.
153. The Court's seriousness about interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence by the plainmeaning standard may become evident if it decides that an accused can introduce statements against
the prosecution as agency admissions. See supranotes 125-42 and accompanying text. The admissibility of this previously banned hearsay will have a major effect on prosecutions, in part because so
many people are government agents, and thus, the number of people who can make agency admissions is so potentially high. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 358
(D.D.C. 1980) (holding that in a civil antitrust suit, the plaintiffwas not just the Justice Department,
but all executive branch agencies, departments, and subdivisions, and therefore, out-of-court declarations by officials of such agencies and departments were admissions). The introduction of agency
admissions against the Government will also cause much new information to be presented because of
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impact-the totality of the changes will transform the law of evidence.
The plain-meaning standard will recast a tremendous amount of our
evidence law because, as the examples indicate, applying the plain-meaning standard will transform numerous provisions of the Rules. Taken
together, so many changes of such differing magnitudes will profoundly
alter the current evidentiary landscape. The required interpretive
method will admit some hearsay that was previously excluded; it will
exclude some hearsay that was previously admitted; it will admit more
evidence of prior crimes; it will remove a restriction on impeachment. It
will be as if someone has altered the topography since the last climb up
the fire tower; one mountain has grown taller, another has moved, and
another has disappeared; streams have widened and scrub pines have
been replaced with hardwoods. The overall effect of the plain-meaning
standard on the Federal Rules of Evidence will be a new evidentiary
map. In short, the standard will lead to a new law of evidence.
We cannot yet see all the details of the evidence law's new topography. The examples in this Article may aid the exploration, but we still
need a thorough mapping of plain-meaning's impact. In order to understand fully the transformations of evidence law, we must not only comprehensively apply the new literalism to all controversies, we must also
systematically apply it to every provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence, for, as the discussion of prior identifications indicates, changes
will come to provisions that are not now disputed.
The systematic application of plain meaning seems easy enough; just
accept the commonsense meaning of the Rules' words. The task, however, may be more difficult than it appears. All of us familiar with the
Rules bring much to our reading of them. Because we know the goals, or
history, or policy, or practical operation of a provision, we view the
Rules through a fog that may prevent us from seeing the true features of
evidence law as defined by plain meaning. It may be difficult to jettison
our existing knowledge of evidence law and just mechanically inspect the
plain language. Those most interested in mastering the evidentiary landscape may have the most difficulty exploring it. As a result, the judges,
the expansive nature of admissions. An admission is admissible even if the declarant does not speak
with firsthand knowledge and even if it incorporates otherwise inadmissible opinions. See, eg., Russell v. United Parcel Serv., 666 F.2d 1188, 1190 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that vicarious admissions in
the form of opinions are admissible and that firsthand knowledge is not required for admissions);
accord Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc., 588 F.2d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 1979)
(holding that neither Rule 805 nor Rule 403 mandates the introduction of an implied requirement of
personal knowledge into Rule 801(d)(2)(D); In re A.H. Robins Co., 575 F. Supp. 718, 724 (D. Kan.
1983) (holding that statements by employees of the company and relating to their involvement in the
project are not hearsay, thus there is no need to demonstrate that the declarant is not expressing an
opinion or that he has firsthand knowledge of the facts that he is relating).
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litigators, and scholars who best knew the rules may no longer be the
best people to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence. 154 Perhaps,those
free of old evidentiary knowledge will have the least difficulty discovering the new plain meaning. We may now find it useful to turn to the
neophyte in evidence to discover the content of the law.
The plain-meaning standard will do more than just transform the
evidentiary landscape; it will also freeze the new forms into unchanging
shapes. Once we discover the most natural reading of the Federal Rules
of Evidence's words and clauses, the law will be fixed until Congress acts.
And Congress will not act often. "One of the facts of legislative life, at
least in this country in this century, is that getting a statute enacted in
the first place is much easier than getting the statute revised so that it
will make sense in the light of changed conditions." 155
The plain-meaning rubric thus squelches evidence law's historic dynamism and abolishes common-law methods of resolving evidentiary disputes. For centuries the common law controlled the rules of evidence. 156
Evidentiary doctrine continually developed, as judges attempted to accommodate logic, policy, tradition, new beliefs, and changed circumstances in deciding cases and reinterpreting precedents. As the plainmeaning standard replaces the common-law methods, much of evidence
law's capacity for orderly growth is lost. 157 As Justice Harlan Stone rec154. Professor Imwinkelried has argued that the Federal Rules operate much like a self-contained civil-law code, abolishing common-law rules that Congress failed to codify and that
the judiciary has lost its common-law power to formulate exclusionary rules of evidence....
This conception of the Federal Rules understandably is unsettling to commentators
and judges schooled in the common law of evidence. In this "Age of Statues," some
yearn-almost nostalgically-to return to the common law of yesteryear.
Imwinkelried, The Meaningof Probative Value and Prejudicein FederalRule of Evidence 403: Can
Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REv. 879, 881-83 (1988)
(footnote omitted).
155. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977). The lack of statutory revision
occurs for several reasons. See, eg., Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L. Rav.
1479, 1524 (1987). Professor Eskridge notes:
Political theory and experience suggest that because of the many procedural obstacles to
legislation in our bicameral committee-dominated Congress, the tendency of interest
groups to block rather than advance legislation, and the deference that legislators and their
staffs will typically give to virtually any decision of the Supreme Court, such legislative
correction will rarely occur.
Id. Dean Guido Calabresi points out that
one-shot losers.., have little incentive to lobby for change in the rule.... [O]ne major
reason for legislative failure to update laws is that if the updating is, like most legislation,
prospective only, those who have already lost have little reason to urge legislators to update. Only if there exist powerful people who know ahead of time that they will lose from
the out-of-phase result can this technique bring about the legislative reaction it seeks.
G. CALABRESI, supra note 152, at 155 (footnotes omitted).
156. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
157. "[T]he genius of the common law, upon which our jurisprudence is based, is its capacity for
orderly growth." Lum v. Fullaway, 42 Haw. 500, 502 (1958); cf Stone, The Common Law in the
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ognized, the common law's "strength is derived from the manner in
which it has been forged from actual experience by the hammer and anvil
of litigation." 158 Before the Supreme Court adopted the plain-meaning
standard, adversaries would debate whether a particular evidentiary
practice led to the best trials and best justice. The judges who saw the
effect of evidence law daily could adapt it in an attempt to make it better.
With plain meaning, that opportunity is lost. From now on, adversaries
should only discuss the most commonsense way to read the words of the
Rules, and the courts will not have the power to adapt and modify the
practices to improve the law.159 When plain meaning controls, stagnation results.
Stagnation will result both because the courts will no longer adapt
evidence law to new knowledge and conditions, and because judges
should no longer write opinions that discuss the best and most feasible
evidentiary practices.1 60 These discussions are, of course, the fuel for debate by scholars and revisers. Those who wish to improve evidence law
have lost a major source for understanding the importance and effect of
that law. Any changes we may have in the future will be based on information less complete than we have had in the past.
We will now also get decisions without any consideration of the wisdom of the results. The Supreme Court indicates that plain meaning
controls even though the Rules' drafters and adopters never considered
the specific issue being litigated. Furthermore, the courts interpreting
the Rules' plain meaning do not aim to further prudent policies, but only
analyze language. Thus, courts will be deciding cases even though no
decision maker will have considered the wisdom of a particular outcome. 16 1 Indeed, Bourlaily typifies this circumstance. 162 The Rules' legislative history does not indicate that anyone considered the effect of
discontinuing the ban on admitting coconspirator statements through
United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 6 (1936) ("[The most significant feature of the common law,
past and present, and the essential element in its historic growth, [is] the fact that it is preeminently a
system built up by gradual accretion of special instances.").
158. Stone, supra note 157, at 7.
159. See Note, supra note 4, at 898 ("With the rise of literal intent, judges have become mere
servitors of a positivistic sovereign: Congress enacts rules that bind judicial action, rather than policies that guide judicial interpretation. The positive commands of a statute's literal words now
demark the bounds of federal judicial power.") (footnotes omitted).
160. Cf.G. CALABRESI, supra note 152, at 278 n.62 ("[Tihe common law needs backwaters,
areas of inconsistencies ....to have any future growth.... [A] fully consistent legal structure would
tend to be a static one in which courts could not advance the law.").
161. Cf.Note, supra note 4, at 905 ("[W]hen Congress is unable to address a problem that arises
within a statutory scheme and the Court continues to 'remand' the problem to Congress by operating in the clear-statement model, a substantive decision results without either institution's explicitly
confronting the choices implicated in that decision.").
162. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
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bootstrapping; the Supreme Court similarly failed to consider the wisdom of its decision. As the logic of Bouraily and the other cases takes
control, and as judges apply the plain-meaning standard throughout the
Rules, we increasingly will have evidentiary practices imposed with no
consideration by anyone of whether those practices are sensible.
V.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court has indicated that judges should apply a plainmeaning standard to the Federal Rules of Evidence. This standard will
affect so many evidentiary practices that the entire evidentiary landscape
will change. Inevitably, however, the plain-meaning standard will produce worse evidence law by freezing evidence into a literalistic mold, by
eliminating its dynamism, and by mandating results without any attempt
to satisfy the policy goals of evidence law.
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